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Autism, modularity and theories of mind.

Cundall, Michael K., Jr.

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Autism, modularity and theories of mind.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Autism, modularity and theories of mind./
作者:	Cundall, Michael K., Jr.
面頁冊數:	156 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2020.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-06A.
標題:	Education, Philosophy of. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3093363
ISBN:	0496410679

Autism, modularity and theories of mind.
Cundall, Michael K., Jr.

Autism, modularity and theories of mind. - 156 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-06, Section: A, page: 2020.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Cincinnati, 2003.

In this dissertation I argue for a wider and more robust notion of the modularity of mind thesis. The developmental disorder of autism is the prime analytic tool for developing this approach. I argue that a variety of other approaches are deeply flawed in that they cannot account for the autistic spectrum disorder. I mean by this the autistic profile of deficits such as the lack of social interaction and the avoidance of social contact. I begin with Fodorian modularity. I argue that autism presents us with a case that threatens the division Fodor has between modules and central systems. The autistic disorder exemplifies an area of higher cognition (theory of mind) that has many of the properties commonly associated with modular processing. Since Fodor cannot opt for a modular account of theory of mind it must be that his account of central systems is incorrect. I next argue that Baron-Cohen's amended modular architecture cannot explain autism since the autistic deficit cannot be due to a defective module for processing intentional action. Furthermore, his use of modularity threatens to make his view of cognition incoherent. Finally I take up Gopnik and Meltzoff's approach that eschews any type of modularity and instead posits a general learning mechanism. If autism, as they claim, were a general theory-building problem, then one should expect to see other behavioral deficits in other areas of autistic cognition. We do not. I then offer an alternative version of modularity inspired by Karmiloff-Smith (1992). It gives us advantages. On Karmiloff-Smith's account we would expect the autistic deficit to have more perceptually basic components and recent research is bearing this out. Progressive modularity also provides us with a framework in which to understand the ways autistic persons understand the social world. This approach also seeks to unify the cognitive work being done on development with burgeoning work on development in neuroscience.

ISBN: 0496410679Subjects--Topical Terms:

783746
Education, Philosophy of.

Autism, modularity and theories of mind.
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