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Essays on the theory of optimal unem...

Isik-Dikmelik, Aylin.

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Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy./
作者:	Isik-Dikmelik, Aylin.
面頁冊數:	168 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-12, Section: A, page: 4669.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-12A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3155626
ISBN:	0496163485

Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy.
Isik-Dikmelik, Aylin.

Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy. - 168 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-12, Section: A, page: 4669.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Johns Hopkins University, 2004.

Expenditures on unemployment insurance (UI) programs constitute up to 2% GDP in developed countries. This dissertation is the first to employ a result from economics of information to improve the efficiency of UI benefit program. We examine the design of optimal UI using the state of the economy as an informative signal to alleviate the moral hazard problem. The first essay extends known results by incorporating the state of the economy as a perfectly predictable informative signal. Optimum UI benefits exhibit a declining profile similar to previously reported results. The presence of an imperfect but informative signal does not prevent the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives that is due to the moral hazard problem. The comparative static result indicates that, as the state of the economy improves, the corresponding optimum benefit declines.

ISBN: 0496163485Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on the theory of optimal unemployment insurance: The informative role of the state of the economy.
300 $a 168 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-12, Section: A, page: 4669.
500 $a Advisers: Edi Karni; Robert Moffitt.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Johns Hopkins University, 2004.
520 $a Expenditures on unemployment insurance (UI) programs constitute up to 2% GDP in developed countries. This dissertation is the first to employ a result from economics of information to improve the efficiency of UI benefit program. We examine the design of optimal UI using the state of the economy as an informative signal to alleviate the moral hazard problem. The first essay extends known results by incorporating the state of the economy as a perfectly predictable informative signal. Optimum UI benefits exhibit a declining profile similar to previously reported results. The presence of an imperfect but informative signal does not prevent the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives that is due to the moral hazard problem. The comparative static result indicates that, as the state of the economy improves, the corresponding optimum benefit declines.
520 $a The second essay provides a more complete analysis of the design of optimum UI in two respects. First, it allows aggregate uncertainty in the economy by modelling the state of the economy as a Markov chain. Second, it captures the asymmetric outlook of the government and the individuals by using an overlapping generations (OLG) framework. We analyze the optimal UI design using the steady-state probabilities. The results show contrary to earlier results that a declining benefit schedule is not necessarily optimal. The policy implication of this chapter's results is that benefits should be contingent on the state of the economy as part of the UI program.
520 $a The third essay solves the model numerically to provide the properties of the optimum UI benefit schedule and to obtain comparative static results. The results confirm our theoretical findings. Specifically, the benefit schedule is not always declining and the shape of the benefit schedule is affected strongly by the level of aggregate uncertainty in the economy and the level of persistence in the states. In addition, we quantify the welfare improvement that the use of the state of the economy as an informative signal brings about. The results show that the welfare improvements are significant, i.e. the decrease in expected cost is 1% to 15%.
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