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Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance.

Zhang, Li.

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Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance./
作者:	Zhang, Li.
面頁冊數:	167 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-07A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR72666
ISBN:	9780494726662

Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance.
Zhang, Li.

Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance. - 167 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-07, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McGill University (Canada), 2010.

This thesis consists of two essays on empirical corporate finance. The first essay documents that the short-run and the long-run stock performance after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is positively related to the pre-issue demand from short-term and long-term institutional investors, respectively. This suggests that institutional investors acquire information that is most relevant to their investment horizons. Moreover, institutional investors' information advantage is more pronounced in cold issue markets than in hot issue markets, confirming firms' tendency to issue equity in periods of reduced information asymmetry. In addition, this essay documents that firms issue seasoned equity at a greater discount when the pre-issue demand from short-term institutional investors is low. The second essay examines the effects of CEO career concern incentives on firm policy. We document that a CEO's probability of being fired is positively related to equity risk, idiosyncratic risk and R&D investments. This supports the idea that CEOs with a very high likelihood of being fired tend to take more risks so that good outcomes can prevent their firing (e.g. Zwiebel (1995)). We also document that when a CEO has a high likelihood of being fired, her firm tends to have a higher leverage ratio and lower firm diversification. This is consistent with the idea that CEOs risk-taking incentives generated when they are facing the pressure of termination could mitigate their risk aversion and induce them to implement riskier corporate policy.

ISBN: 9780494726662Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance.
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