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The Party and the "Personal" Vote: T...

Preece, Jessica Robinson.

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The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries./
作者:	Preece, Jessica Robinson.
面頁冊數:	112 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1429.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-04A.
標題:	Baltic Studies. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3446817
ISBN:	9781124505435

The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries.
Preece, Jessica Robinson.

The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries. - 112 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: 1429.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2010.

In countries where electoral rules encourage candidates to develop a "personal vote," parties are generally assumed to be fairly weak. However, parties often have non-obvious ways of influencing the political process, even in ostensibly candidate-centered systems. These include formal or informal control over "ballot access"---candidate selection, nominations, and party list rankings---as well as the ability to co-opt the means of cultivating a personal vote through controlling reputation-building resources like name recognition, campaign funds, pork and patronage, and voting record. This dissertation highlights these ways in which parties are able to undermine the autonomy politicians are assumed to have in political systems that encourage a personal vote.

ISBN: 9781124505435Subjects--Topical Terms:

1679683
Baltic Studies.

The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries.
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245 1 4 $a The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System Countries.
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520 $a In countries where electoral rules encourage candidates to develop a "personal vote," parties are generally assumed to be fairly weak. However, parties often have non-obvious ways of influencing the political process, even in ostensibly candidate-centered systems. These include formal or informal control over "ballot access"---candidate selection, nominations, and party list rankings---as well as the ability to co-opt the means of cultivating a personal vote through controlling reputation-building resources like name recognition, campaign funds, pork and patronage, and voting record. This dissertation highlights these ways in which parties are able to undermine the autonomy politicians are assumed to have in political systems that encourage a personal vote.
520 $a It begins by clarifying the contradictory literature on legislative voting behavior in mixed-member electoral system countries by showing that type of electoral mandate alone does not consistently predict which class of politicians will defect from the party line more frequently; however, when type of electoral mandate is considered in concert with whether parties or voters control ballot access, consistent patterns emerge. Namely, when parties control nominations, politicians tend to vote with the party, even when they are elected under majoritarian electoral rules.
520 $a The dissertation continues with a close examination of 2004 and 2008 election returns in one mixed-member electoral system country, Lithuania. It finds that even when controlling for a variety of factors such as a politician's voting record, incumbency status, geographic constituency, campaign finance, and performance in previous elections, voters appear to be highly influenced by parties' pre-election ranking of candidates when they allocate their preference votes in the open-list PR component of the election. This suggests that even under electoral laws that promote candidate-centeredness, parties have the ability to exert significant influence over the "personal" vote by controlling resources that politicians need to develop their personal reputation.
520 $a All of these findings reinforce the point that researchers must consider the full range of both formal and informal electoral incentives that politicians face. The oft-overlooked factor of who controls access to the ballot deserves to be included alongside other electoral incentives. Further, who controls the means of cultivating a personal vote also deserves to be seriously considered. Both of these variables have the ability to significantly alter the chain of accountability between parties and politicians.
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