東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence ...

Debroy, Papia.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements./
作者:	Debroy, Papia.
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-03, Section: A, page: 1065.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-03A.
標題:	Environmental Law. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3441148
ISBN:	9781124438214

Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements.
Debroy, Papia.

Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements. - 143 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-03, Section: A, page: 1065.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2010.

When do states successfully form international agreements, and how are they designed? This dissertation explains the incidence of international agreements, and their flexibility and monitoring designs. Existing work focuses on how states strategically solve cooperation problems. Yet, these explanations do not account for the timing of an agreement. This is important for the effects it has on the depth and longevity of cooperation between two states. I argue that when an executive seeks out an agreement is dependent on his executive preferences, the interest group preferences in his winning coalition and the ability of partnering states to credibly signal their commitment due to their regime type. I detail why the credibility of commitment differs across democratic, single-party, personalist and military regimes. I then hypothesize that when executive partisanship aligns, when interest groups have a strong lobbying presence in both states in a dyad and when both states are able to signal credibility in their commitment, agreements are more likely to form. I also hypothesize that these variables affect how the agreement will be designed: executive partisanship alignment leads to lower levels of flexibility and lower levels of monitoring while greater credibility of commitment across dyads leads to more flexibility and less monitoring across dyads. I test my hypotheses on two populations of agreements: bilateral environmental agreements and preferential trade agreements. I find some support for my argument that executive partisanship alignment and interest groups affect the incidence of cooperation. I find strong support that the credibility of commitment affects the incidence and design of cooperation; specifically, agreements are more likely to be formed with democracies and single-party regimes. In addition, agreements are more likely to include monitoring and flexibility provisions with personalist and military regimes than democratic and single-party regimes.

ISBN: 9781124438214Subjects--Topical Terms:

676816
Environmental Law.

Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements.
LDR:02968nam 2200301 4500 001 1400545
005 20111010080623.5
008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124438214
035 $a (UMI)AAI3441148
035 $a AAI3441148
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Debroy, Papia. $3 1679608
245 1 0 $a Choosing Cooperation: The Incidence and Design of International Agreements.
300 $a 143 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-03, Section: A, page: 1065.
500 $a Advisers: Barbara Koremenos; James D. Morrow.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2010.
520 $a When do states successfully form international agreements, and how are they designed? This dissertation explains the incidence of international agreements, and their flexibility and monitoring designs. Existing work focuses on how states strategically solve cooperation problems. Yet, these explanations do not account for the timing of an agreement. This is important for the effects it has on the depth and longevity of cooperation between two states. I argue that when an executive seeks out an agreement is dependent on his executive preferences, the interest group preferences in his winning coalition and the ability of partnering states to credibly signal their commitment due to their regime type. I detail why the credibility of commitment differs across democratic, single-party, personalist and military regimes. I then hypothesize that when executive partisanship aligns, when interest groups have a strong lobbying presence in both states in a dyad and when both states are able to signal credibility in their commitment, agreements are more likely to form. I also hypothesize that these variables affect how the agreement will be designed: executive partisanship alignment leads to lower levels of flexibility and lower levels of monitoring while greater credibility of commitment across dyads leads to more flexibility and less monitoring across dyads. I test my hypotheses on two populations of agreements: bilateral environmental agreements and preferential trade agreements. I find some support for my argument that executive partisanship alignment and interest groups affect the incidence of cooperation. I find strong support that the credibility of commitment affects the incidence and design of cooperation; specifically, agreements are more likely to be formed with democracies and single-party regimes. In addition, agreements are more likely to include monitoring and flexibility provisions with personalist and military regimes than democratic and single-party regimes.
590 $a School code: 0127.
650 4 $a Environmental Law. $3 676816
650 4 $a Political Science, International Relations. $3 1669648
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0439
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a University of Michigan. $3 777416
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-03A.
790 1 0 $a Koremenos, Barbara, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Morrow, James D., $e advisor
790 $a 0127
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3441148