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Essays on the Economics of Communica...

Makarov, Uliana.

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Essays on the Economics of Communication.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the Economics of Communication./
作者:	Makarov, Uliana.
面頁冊數:	137 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-09A.
標題:	Psychology, Behavioral. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3459198
ISBN:	9781124681214

Essays on the Economics of Communication.
Makarov, Uliana.

Essays on the Economics of Communication. - 137 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2011.

Chapter 1 studies the tradeoff of knowledge generation and information flow in organizations, and explains why many modern firms choose to replace corporate meetings with one-on-one communication. In a theoretical model we compare the efficiency of employee communication during a meeting with the efficiency during a pairwise one-on-one communication. The quality of information transmission between agents depends on the accuracy of active communication (talking) and the accuracy of passive communication (listening), which is costly for the agents and is selected prior to communication. In addition, before the communication stage, all agents choose how much to invest in the precision of their private information. We find that meetings make the communication more precise and less costly; however, they have an undesirable effect of reducing incentives for the agents to invest in obtaining their own information. If a firm cannot commit to an optimal communication policy ex-ante, the agents will underinvest in information acquisition and the firm will have to compensate with a larger frequency of meetings. Thus we obtain an inefficiently high equilibrium frequency of meetings due to the lack of commitment by the firms.

ISBN: 9781124681214Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017677
Psychology, Behavioral.

Essays on the Economics of Communication.
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300 $a 137 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Roland Benabou.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2011.
520 $a Chapter 1 studies the tradeoff of knowledge generation and information flow in organizations, and explains why many modern firms choose to replace corporate meetings with one-on-one communication. In a theoretical model we compare the efficiency of employee communication during a meeting with the efficiency during a pairwise one-on-one communication. The quality of information transmission between agents depends on the accuracy of active communication (talking) and the accuracy of passive communication (listening), which is costly for the agents and is selected prior to communication. In addition, before the communication stage, all agents choose how much to invest in the precision of their private information. We find that meetings make the communication more precise and less costly; however, they have an undesirable effect of reducing incentives for the agents to invest in obtaining their own information. If a firm cannot commit to an optimal communication policy ex-ante, the agents will underinvest in information acquisition and the firm will have to compensate with a larger frequency of meetings. Thus we obtain an inefficiently high equilibrium frequency of meetings due to the lack of commitment by the firms.
520 $a Chapter 2 provides an explanation for why many organizations are concerned with "e-mail overload" and implement policies to restrict the use of e-mail in the office. In a theoretical model we formalize the tradeoff between increased productivity from high priority communication and reduced productivity due to distractions caused by low priority e-mails. We consider employees with present-biased preferences as well as time consistent employees. All present-biased employees ex-ante are motivated to read only important e-mail, but in the interim some agents find the temptation to read all e-mail in their inbox too high, and as a result suffer from productivity losses. A unique aspect of this paper is the social nature of procrastination, which is a key to the e-mail overload phenomenon. In considering the firm's policies to reduce the impact of e-mail overload we conclude that a firm is more likely to restrict e-mail in the case of employees with hyperbolic preferences than in the case of time-consistent employees.
520 $a Chapter 3 is joint work with Marco Battaglini. We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender's and receivers' preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equilibrium. More interestingly, we find clear evidence that the addition of another audience alters the communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of the presence of agents that are systematically truthful as senders and trusting as receivers. Deviations from the theoretical predictions, however, tend to disappear with experience, and learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.
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650 4 $a Psychology, Social. $3 529430
650 4 $a Speech Communication. $3 1017408
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Psychology, Industrial. $3 520063
650 4 $a Sociology, Sociolinguistics. $3 1669082
650 4 $a Sociology, Organizational. $3 1018023
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