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Reputation, corruption and policy pl...

Zheng, Haochi.

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Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program./
作者:	Zheng, Haochi.
面頁冊數:	111 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4115.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-11A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3426501
ISBN:	9781124274607

Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program.
Zheng, Haochi.

Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program. - 111 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4115.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2010.

Since 1999, China has spent RMB 50 billion (about

ISBN: 9781124274607Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program.
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245 1 0 $a Reputation, corruption and policy planning: A study of China's "Grain for Green" program.
300 $a 111 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-11, Section: A, page: 4115.
500 $a Advisers: Paul Glewwe; Stephen Polasky.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2010.
520 $a Since 1999, China has spent RMB 50 billion (about $7 billion) to implement the "Grain for Green" program, the largest land retirement program in the developing world. From 1999 to 2003, over 7.2 million hectares were retired under the program. However, many farmers report that they did not receive compensation, as promised under the program in exchange for planting trees on agricultural land. This paper examines the impacts of subsidy payment shortfalls, delayed payments and program uncertainty on farmers' participation in the program. A stylized reputation game model is used to explain how village-level corruption (subsidy underpayment), along with uncertainty regarding the likely longevity of the program, will discourage farmers' participation in the program. Panel data are used to estimate the impact of previous payment shortfalls on subsequent land conversion. A strong negative impact is found. Village level payment information is used to identify both the impact on program participation of corruption and the impact of policy uncertainty regarding the program's longevity. Further investigation reveals that variation in payment realization and program participation appear to be driven by household specific characteristics, such as being a Communist Party member or working for the local government. These results provide useful guidance on how to make conservation efforts more effective and cost efficient in developing countries.
590 $a School code: 0130.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
690 $a 0503
710 2 $a University of Minnesota. $b Agricultural and Applied Economics. $3 1020271
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-11A.
790 1 0 $a Glewwe, Paul, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Polasky, Stephen, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Pardey, Philip $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Huang, Qiuqiong $e committee member
790 $a 0130
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3426501