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Antidumping effects in the presence ...

Suchato, Ravissa.

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Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand./
作者:	Suchato, Ravissa.
面頁冊數:	137 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-09, Section: A, page: 3574.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-09A.
標題:	Economics, Agricultural. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3372992
ISBN:	9781109383676

Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand.
Suchato, Ravissa.

Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand. - 137 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-09, Section: A, page: 3574.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.

Many studies have shown a relationship between antidumping duty and collusion. These studies, however, only focus on collusion in output (downstream) market, i.e. collusion between import competing firms and exporters, or among import competing firms. This dissertation explores how the antidumping duty on downstream goods can affect collusive behavior in an upstream market of exporters whom are subjected to the duty.

ISBN: 9781109383676Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand.
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100 1 $a Suchato, Ravissa. $3 1676741
245 1 0 $a Antidumping effects in the presence of collusion in an upstream market: The case of U.S. frozen shrimp imports from Thailand.
300 $a 137 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-09, Section: A, page: 3574.
500 $a Advisers: Carol McAusland; John K. Horowitz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.
520 $a Many studies have shown a relationship between antidumping duty and collusion. These studies, however, only focus on collusion in output (downstream) market, i.e. collusion between import competing firms and exporters, or among import competing firms. This dissertation explores how the antidumping duty on downstream goods can affect collusive behavior in an upstream market of exporters whom are subjected to the duty.
520 $a Bertrand duopoly model with infinite periods is developed to examine the effect of the antidumping duty on collusive behavior. Under a set of discount rate, whether is influenced by a tariff or the antidumping duty, the exporters will fully cooperate. The unaffected rate might be due to the linearity in input supply and output demand assumptions. Although the discount rate is not sufficiently high enough to support the full cooperation, the collusive behavior is still feasible through self-enforcing agreement. With future period self-enforcing agreement, under the antidumping duty, the full cooperation in the initial period that is feasible under a set of the discount rate is called "the restricted full cooperation". The set under free trade that supports the full cooperation is smaller than the one supporting the restricted full cooperation. Therefore, the antidumping duty on downstream goods is pro-collusive in the upstream market.
520 $a The theoretical result is tested by using Thai shrimp industry data during 1996-2009; the industry has been subjected to the U.S. antidumping duty since 2005. 2SLS is employed to estimate a system of Thai fresh shrimp supply, the U.S. demand for Thai frozen shrimp, and the mark up equations. Using comparative static in supply approach, with an interaction between fresh shrimp price and rainfall as a supply rotator, the empirical results confirm that the antidumping duty increases the degree of collusion among the exporters in Thai shrimp market at 1% significant level.
590 $a School code: 0117.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
690 $a 0503
710 2 $a University of Maryland, College Park. $b Agricultural and Resource Economics. $3 1277322
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 70-09A.
790 1 0 $a McAusland, Carol, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Horowitz, John K., $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Lipton, Douglas $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Leathers, Howard $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Limao, Nuno $e committee member
790 $a 0117
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3372992