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Naturalism, realism, and Hume's phil...

Lorkowski, Chris Michael.

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Naturalism, realism, and Hume's philosophy of religion.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Naturalism, realism, and Hume's philosophy of religion./
作者:	Lorkowski, Chris Michael.
面頁冊數:	240 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3297.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-09A.
標題:	Religion, Philosophy of. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3413905
ISBN:	9781124155265

Naturalism, realism, and Hume's philosophy of religion.
Lorkowski, Chris Michael.

Naturalism, realism, and Hume's philosophy of religion. - 240 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3297.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Purdue University, 2010.

This purpose of the present inquiry is to study the relationship between David Hume's doxastic naturalism, causal realism, and philosophy of religion. Though Hume is standardly read as either a causal reductionist or a causal skeptic, I argue that a realist reading becomes possible if one accepts that Hume has three interpretive tools at his disposal and employs them in a certain way. The most important for my purposes is a non-rational doxastically appropriate belief-generation mechanism. I argue that Hume has such a mechanism at work in his corpus, and that it justifies our causal beliefs, making their grounding instinctual. However, after rejecting the standard account of this mechanism, I show that belief in the deity of attenuated deism is also instinctual, and once this is realized, an elegant reading of the Dialogues becomes manifest. After dismissing several other pieces of evidence often thought to count against reading Philo as Hume's thoroughgoing spokesman, I turn to Philo's Reversal. If Hume is a doxastic naturalist of the type I describe, then the Reversal is exactly what we would expect, as Philo is both a skeptical philosopher and a doxastic naturalist, and he represents Hume throughout the entire work. Once we realize that Philo's words are Hume's, then his philosophy of religion corpus becomes more clearly realist. I argue that the realist position explains passages pertaining to causation and the laws of nature found in "Of Suicide," The Natural History, and the Dialogues much better than either the skeptic or the reductionist. After arguing for Hume's realism in this way, I apply it to another area of his philosophy of religion, the Enquiry argument against miracles. Here, I show how Humean realism may overcome standard modality-based objections to the argument.

ISBN: 9781124155265Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017774
Religion, Philosophy of.

Naturalism, realism, and Hume's philosophy of religion.
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