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Essays on the incentives to manage p...

Gao, Feng.

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Essays on the incentives to manage public float.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the incentives to manage public float./
作者:	Gao, Feng.
面頁冊數:	159 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 1883.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-06A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3410609
ISBN:	9781124028194

Essays on the incentives to manage public float.
Gao, Feng.

Essays on the incentives to manage public float. - 159 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 1883.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2010.

Chapter 1 examines a previously undocumented action that firms take to manage public float. The SEC uses a bright line public float threshold to differentiate among different reporting and disclosure requirements based on firm size. This motivates some firms to manage public float around the threshold to reduce compliance cost. Depending on whether the regulations favor small or large firms, firms underreport or overreport public float by counting more or fewer shares as "affiliated." I find that some non-accelerated filers underreport public float to delay Section 404 and reduce audit fees. I also find that some firms overreport public float to register on the cost efficient Form S-3.

ISBN: 9781124028194Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Essays on the incentives to manage public float.
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520 $a Chapter 1 examines a previously undocumented action that firms take to manage public float. The SEC uses a bright line public float threshold to differentiate among different reporting and disclosure requirements based on firm size. This motivates some firms to manage public float around the threshold to reduce compliance cost. Depending on whether the regulations favor small or large firms, firms underreport or overreport public float by counting more or fewer shares as "affiliated." I find that some non-accelerated filers underreport public float to delay Section 404 and reduce audit fees. I also find that some firms overreport public float to register on the cost efficient Form S-3.
520 $a Chapter 2 provides evidence about the unintended consequences arising when small companies are exempted from costly regulations, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in particular. Some small firms have incentives to stay small, by undertaking less investment, making more cash payouts to shareholders, reducing the number of shares held by non-affiliates, making more bad news disclosures and reporting lower earnings than control firms. Finally, there is no evidence that firms remaining small are doing so to maintain insiders' private control benefits. These findings have implications beyond SOX because numerous federal and state regulations exempt small firms via bright line size thresholds.
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