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Essays on unemployment policies.

Setty, Ofer.

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Essays on unemployment policies.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on unemployment policies./
作者:	Setty, Ofer.
面頁冊數:	164 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2570.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-07A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3408311
ISBN:	9781124043432

Essays on unemployment policies.
Setty, Ofer.

Essays on unemployment policies. - 164 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2570.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2010.

This dissertation comprises three essays that are linked by their focus on policies towards unemployed workers.

ISBN: 9781124043432Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays on unemployment policies.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on unemployment policies.
300 $a 164 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-07, Section: A, page: 2570.
500 $a Adviser: Giovanni Luca Violante.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2010.
520 $a This dissertation comprises three essays that are linked by their focus on policies towards unemployed workers.
520 $a In Chapter 1, "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring", I model monitoring of the job-search effort of unemployed workers in the optimal unemployment insurance framework of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), where job-search effort is private information for the unemployed worker. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions the unemployment benefits. In the optimal monitoring scheme, endogenous sanctions and rewards, together with random monitoring, create effective job-search incentives for the unemployed worker. I calibrate the model to the US economy and find that the addition of optimal monitoring to the optimal unemployment insurance scheme decreases the variance of consumption by about two thirds and eliminates roughly half of the government's cost associated with employment incentives.
520 $a In Chapter 2, "Optimal Welfare Programs with Search, Work and Training" (joint with Nicola Pavoni and Gianluca Violante) we extend the recent recursive contract literature on optimal unemployment insurance and optimal welfare-to-work programs. This rich environment allows us to formally introduce policies such as Job-search assistance, mandatory work, and on-the-job training into the dynamic principal-agent problem. Following the characterization of the optimal sequence of these policies along a typical unemployment spell, we derive some quantitative implications by calibrating our model through a novel data source.
520 $a In Chapter 3, "Unemployment Accounts", I study the welfare implications of a shift from the current Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in the United States to an alternative system called Unemployment Accounts (UA). The UA system works as follows. During employment, the worker is mandated to make deposits into the individual saving account. The worker is entitled to withdraw payments from this account only during unemployment. In contrast, UI is funded by a payroll tax and provides benefits for a limited duration. I build an heterogeneous agents, incomplete-markets life-cycle model, in which workers face income fluctuations and unemployment shocks. For a plausible parameterization the shift from UI to UA leads to an average welfare gain of 0.9% of lifetime consumption.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
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710 2 $a New York University. $b Economics. $3 1032403
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-07A.
790 1 0 $a Violante, Giovanni Luca, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Violante, Giovanni L. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Clementi, Gian Luca $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Ljungqvist, Lars $e committee member
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3408311