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Empirical essays on auctions.

Roberts, James W.

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Empirical essays on auctions.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Empirical essays on auctions./
作者:	Roberts, James W.
面頁冊數:	201 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4786.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-12A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3386470
ISBN:	9781109518160

Empirical essays on auctions.
Roberts, James W.

Empirical essays on auctions. - 201 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4786.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2009.

This dissertation is focused on improving society's understanding of auctions. Each of the three chapters aims to achieve this goal through methodological, policy and experimental analysis of this commonly used mechanism, respectively.

ISBN: 9781109518160Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Empirical essays on auctions.
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245 1 0 $a Empirical essays on auctions.
300 $a 201 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4786.
500 $a Adviser: Robert Porter.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2009.
520 $a This dissertation is focused on improving society's understanding of auctions. Each of the three chapters aims to achieve this goal through methodological, policy and experimental analysis of this commonly used mechanism, respectively.
520 $a Chapter one addresses the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in auctions to improve our estimates of the distribution of bidder values. The method uses reserve prices to allow the distribution of bidders' private information to depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity. The identifying assumption is that reserve prices are monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity and sellers are not required to set reserve prices optimally. The model can be estimated using only transaction prices. The paper proposes an estimation method and derives the asymptotic distribution of the proposed estimator. Working with data on used car auctions, the paper shows that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity affects estimates of the distribution of bidder values and impacts predicted outcomes dramatically.
520 $a Chapter two analyzes whether a market-wide warranty policy issued by the market maker can substitute for individual retailers' reputations. The context is a buyer protection program instituted by an online auction marketplace, covering big-ticket investment items such as tractors and metalworking equipment. The creation of the new warranty policy allows us to analyze the ability of such a policy to substitute for sellers' reputations and promote a more competitive market for lesser-known or less reputable sellers. The findings suggest that such a policy does have an impact and lowers the premium earned by better-known sellers. Also, the policy had a "flattening effect" on the importance of reputation that before varied at different price levels. The policy decreased the failure rates of small sellers and increased the number of bids they receive. There is evidence that sellers of items which will not be fully covered, due to the fact that their item will sell for more than the maximum amount dictated by policy guidelines, alter their behavior by lowering the starting bid for their items by as much as 50%. To further support these results, I perform falsification exercises, which demonstrate that markets for items nominally covered by the policy, but technically ineligible due to the policy's specifications on minimum price, remain unaffected by the policy.
520 $a Chapter three was co-authored with Seda Ertac and Ali Hortacsu. It investigates entry decisions into first and second price auctions using an experimental design to extract information on willingness-to-pay to enter (WTE). We find that subjects tend to overpay to enter both auction formats. In particular, if the subjects believe they will be bidding against bidders following the risk-neutral Nash strategy, their WTE is greater than the optimal risk-neutral amount 97% of the time for first-price auctions (FPA) and 90% for second-price auctions (SPA). If they believe that they are bidding against subjects who bid as do the other subjects, they submit a WTE that is too high 92% of the time for FPA and 69% of the time for SPA. We also find, in line with previous studies, significant overbidding in both the FPA and SPA. We then investigate whether introducing risk aversion (RA) or "joy of winning" (JOY) can explain the joint observation of over-entry and overbidding. In particular, using bid data alone, we structurally estimate three models, one allowing RA only, one allowing for JOY only and one allowing for both RA and JOY. While a model with JOY alone overestimates WTE, we find that RA alone can explain 38% of WTE but a model with both RA and JOY (where RA is estimated using FPA bids, and JOY is estimated using SPA bids) can explain 65% of WTE. Moreover, JOY appears to explain nearly all of the of the male WTE but only 44% of the female WTE.
590 $a School code: 0163.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Economics. $3 1020895
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 70-12A.
790 1 0 $a Porter, Robert, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Hendel, Igal $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Hortacsu, Ali $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Nevo, Aviv $e committee member
790 $a 0163
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3386470