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The semantics of 'ought' and the uni...

Cariani, Fabrizio.

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The semantics of 'ought' and the unity of modal discourse.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The semantics of 'ought' and the unity of modal discourse./
作者:	Cariani, Fabrizio.
面頁冊數:	159 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 2085.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-06A.
標題:	Philosophy of Science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3411236
ISBN:	9781124037233

The semantics of 'ought' and the unity of modal discourse.
Cariani, Fabrizio.

The semantics of 'ought' and the unity of modal discourse. - 159 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-06, Section: A, page: 2085.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.

The current paradigm in intensional semantics views modality as a deeply unified phenomenon. What used to be called 'kinds' (alethic, epistemic, deontic) of modalities are now described as different uses of modal expressions. My dissertation explores how deontic modals, and especially 'ought', challenge this unificationist paradigm. A unificationist approach promises a semantic model with the advantages of simplicity and familiarity. This model is built on a quantificational semantics, roughly in this style: (*) &ceill0; alpha ought to &phis; &ceilr0; is true just in case at all the most ideal worlds alpha does &phis;. I show that a semantic model with much milder ambitions of unification gives better empirical predictions and is better suited for the intended applications than the paradigm unificationist view.

ISBN: 9781124037233Subjects--Topical Terms:

894954
Philosophy of Science.

The semantics of 'ought' and the unity of modal discourse.
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500 $a Adviser: John G. MacFarlane.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2009.
520 $a The current paradigm in intensional semantics views modality as a deeply unified phenomenon. What used to be called 'kinds' (alethic, epistemic, deontic) of modalities are now described as different uses of modal expressions. My dissertation explores how deontic modals, and especially 'ought', challenge this unificationist paradigm. A unificationist approach promises a semantic model with the advantages of simplicity and familiarity. This model is built on a quantificational semantics, roughly in this style: (*) &ceill0; alpha ought to &phis; &ceilr0; is true just in case at all the most ideal worlds alpha does &phis;. I show that a semantic model with much milder ambitions of unification gives better empirical predictions and is better suited for the intended applications than the paradigm unificationist view.
520 $a My preferred approach is contrastive and not quantificational. 'Joe ought to feed his pets' is true just in case feeding his pets is better (relative to the contextually salient standards) than the contextually specified alternatives. However, I uphold a degree of unificationism on an issue regarding logical form. Relationalists, as I call them, believe that there is a deeper mistake in (*). A claim like 'Joe ought to go for a walk with Elizabeth' can have a reading on which Joe is required to go for a walk with Elizabeth through his own agency. For Relationalists, the 'ought' that generates this reading expresses a relation between an agent (Joe) and an action (going for a walk with Elizabeth). On this view, instances of (*) are not even well-formed. By contrast, the unificationist view is that 'ought', just like epistemic and alethic modals, always applies to propositions. I argue, that although some concessions to the Relationalist are indispensable, a relatively unified account of the grammar of deontic modalities and other types of modals is possible.
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