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Political ownership and the behaviou...

Bennedsen, Morten.

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Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups./
Author:	Bennedsen, Morten.
Description:	108 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-05, Section: A, page: 1704.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International59-05A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9832325
ISBN:	9780591854626

Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups.
Bennedsen, Morten.

Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups. - 108 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-05, Section: A, page: 1704.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 1998.

Chapter 1. Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether privately or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising from the interest groups' lobby activities invalidates the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other words, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.

ISBN: 9780591854626Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups.
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020 $a 9780591854626
035 $a (UMI)AAI9832325
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Bennedsen, Morten. $3 1672604
245 1 0 $a Political ownership and the behaviour of special interest groups.
300 $a 108 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-05, Section: A, page: 1704.
500 $a Adviser: Oliver D. Hart.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 1998.
520 $a Chapter 1. Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether privately or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising from the interest groups' lobby activities invalidates the Coase Theorem. Then I proceed to investigate how the allocation of property rights between a government and a group of private owners determines the equilibrium allocation of resources in a firm. In other words, I provide a theory of why ownership matters.
520 $a Chapter 2. I analyze how lobby groups influence output and employment levels in government controlled enterprises and derive three implications from this observation. First, it is shown that lobby groups can have a significant impact on resource allocation even if they do not make any contributions to political parties in equilibrium. Second, the ability of government controlled enterprises to correct market failures depends on if this correction is aligned with the interests of the lobby groups. Finally, the distribution of cash flow rights between the government and private owners affects the level of output and employment in the enterprise.
520 $a Chapter 3 (Joint with Sven Feldmann). Interest groups can influence political decisions in two distinct ways: by offering contributions to political actors and by providing them with relevant information that is advantageous for the group. We analyze the conditions under which interest groups are more inclined to use one or the other channel of influence. First, we identify an indirect cost of searching for information in the form of an information externality that increases the cost of offering contributions. We then show that an extreme interest group might find it beneficial to abandon information search altogether and instead seek influence solely via contributions. Thus, our analysis lends support to a rather cynical view of lobbying wherein groups provide little or no useful information.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 59-05A.
790 1 0 $a Hart, Oliver D., $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9832325