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Regulating finance: Expert cognitive...

Palmer, Damon B.

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Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change./
Author:	Palmer, Damon B.
Description:	547 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3414.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-09A.
Subject:	Economics, Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3413872
ISBN:	9781124154602

Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change.
Palmer, Damon B.

Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change. - 547 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3414.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2010.

My dissertation seeks to understand how and why governments make major changes in financial sector regulations. I focus on two specific puzzles. First why is financial sector regulation not normally central to electoral competition and why are changes in financial sector regulation rare events? Second, why do we observe substantive intellectual debates and efforts of policy persuasion despite the conclusion of many researchers and observers that financial regulatory policy outcomes are driven by the preferences of powerful special interest groups? What are the mechanisms precisely by which ideas versus interests shape policy outcomes in a domain that is not often central to electoral politics? I investigate these questions through a formal game theoretical model of the regulatory policymaking process and through case studies of historic episodes of financial regulatory change in the United States which draw upon a wide variety of primary and secondary source historical materials. I conclude that financial regulatory change is most likely to occur when events of different types cause heads of government to perceive that the existing regulatory status quo threatens the realization of broader policy objectives. Heads of financial sector policy bureaucracies shape outcomes by providing cognitive frameworks through which leaders understand regulatory consequences. Interest groups influence policy outcomes primarily through their ability to act as veto players rather than by controlling the policy agenda.

ISBN: 9781124154602Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change.
LDR:02723nam 2200349 4500 001 1393888
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008 130515s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124154602
035 $a (UMI)AAI3413872
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Palmer, Damon B. $3 1672468
245 1 0 $a Regulating finance: Expert cognitive frameworks, adaptive learning, and interests in financial regulatory change.
300 $a 547 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3414.
500 $a Advisers: Herbert Kitschelt; Karen Remmer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2010.
520 $a My dissertation seeks to understand how and why governments make major changes in financial sector regulations. I focus on two specific puzzles. First why is financial sector regulation not normally central to electoral competition and why are changes in financial sector regulation rare events? Second, why do we observe substantive intellectual debates and efforts of policy persuasion despite the conclusion of many researchers and observers that financial regulatory policy outcomes are driven by the preferences of powerful special interest groups? What are the mechanisms precisely by which ideas versus interests shape policy outcomes in a domain that is not often central to electoral politics? I investigate these questions through a formal game theoretical model of the regulatory policymaking process and through case studies of historic episodes of financial regulatory change in the United States which draw upon a wide variety of primary and secondary source historical materials. I conclude that financial regulatory change is most likely to occur when events of different types cause heads of government to perceive that the existing regulatory status quo threatens the realization of broader policy objectives. Heads of financial sector policy bureaucracies shape outcomes by providing cognitive frameworks through which leaders understand regulatory consequences. Interest groups influence policy outcomes primarily through their ability to act as veto players rather than by controlling the policy agenda.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a Duke University. $b Political Science. $3 1022396
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-09A.
790 1 0 $a Kitschelt, Herbert, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Remmer, Karen, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Kitschelt, Herbert $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Remmer, Karen $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Wibbels, Erik $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Leventoglu, Bahar $e committee member
790 $a 0066
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3413872