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Social justice and moral psychology.

Freiman, Christopher Alexander.

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Social justice and moral psychology.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Social justice and moral psychology./
作者:	Freiman, Christopher Alexander.
面頁冊數:	135 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-05, Section: A, page: 1657.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-05A.
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3402025
ISBN:	9781109736113

Social justice and moral psychology.
Freiman, Christopher Alexander.

Social justice and moral psychology. - 135 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-05, Section: A, page: 1657.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2010.

Emerging work in moral psychology challenges our confidence in our moral judgment. Our moral intuitions have been attributed to automatic, emotionally laden processes and are alleged to be accordingly deficient. Intuitive moral judgments apparently neglect some of the most basic concerns of moral decision-making; for example, they purportedly disregard relevant information, fail to balance competing considerations, and ignore social costs and benefits. Some moral psychologists propose an evolutionary explanation, suggesting that our moral sensibilities track matters of adaptive, rather than moral, significance.

ISBN: 9781109736113Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.

Social justice and moral psychology.
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245 1 0 $a Social justice and moral psychology.
300 $a 135 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-05, Section: A, page: 1657.
500 $a Adviser: David Schmidtz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2010.
520 $a Emerging work in moral psychology challenges our confidence in our moral judgment. Our moral intuitions have been attributed to automatic, emotionally laden processes and are alleged to be accordingly deficient. Intuitive moral judgments apparently neglect some of the most basic concerns of moral decision-making; for example, they purportedly disregard relevant information, fail to balance competing considerations, and ignore social costs and benefits. Some moral psychologists propose an evolutionary explanation, suggesting that our moral sensibilities track matters of adaptive, rather than moral, significance.
520 $a These findings are disconcerting and might naturally be taken to unsettle our philosophical practice. An empirically-informed moral psychology seems to discredit moral common sense as well as prevailing accounts of method and justification in moral and political philosophy. In turn, it threatens to undermine substantive conceptions of matters such as virtue, rights, and distributive justice.
520 $a I argue that contemporary moral psychology does not, as is often supposed, necessitate radical revisions to our conception of morality. Recent research does oblige us to reevaluate many of our views in moral and political philosophy; however, I argue that it also gives us the opportunity to supply these views with new and stronger support.
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710 2 $a The University of Arizona. $b Philosophy. $3 1028856
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 71-05A.
790 1 0 $a Schmidtz, David, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Annas, Julia $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Christiano, Thomas $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Gaus, Gerald $e committee member
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