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Essays on finance and regulation.

Brown, Craig O.

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Essays on finance and regulation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on finance and regulation./
作者:	Brown, Craig O.
面頁冊數:	113 p.
附註:	Adviser: Hasan Nejat Seyhun.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-07A.
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3224828
ISBN:	9780542786242

Essays on finance and regulation.
Brown, Craig O.

Essays on finance and regulation. - 113 p.

Adviser: Hasan Nejat Seyhun.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2006.

In this dissertation, I present two financial sector regulation papers that take account of political economy considerations. The first paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries: About 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns. The second paper studies self-dealing in securities issuance, which can be characterized by an issuing manager who gains at the expense of the other existing stakeholders in the issue. The current system of public securities issuance for U.S. states potentially allows for conflict of interest through campaign contributions that benefit issuing officials. The paper shows that an increase in the amount of campaign contributions by an underwriter results in an increase in the likelihood of selection in the absence of a prior underwriting relationship. It also shows that selecting a contributing underwriter through negotiation results in underpricing compared to a non-contributing underwriter. There exists no such difference for bonds issued through the competitive method.

ISBN: 9780542786242Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Essays on finance and regulation.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2006.
520 $a In this dissertation, I present two financial sector regulation papers that take account of political economy considerations. The first paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries: About 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns. The second paper studies self-dealing in securities issuance, which can be characterized by an issuing manager who gains at the expense of the other existing stakeholders in the issue. The current system of public securities issuance for U.S. states potentially allows for conflict of interest through campaign contributions that benefit issuing officials. The paper shows that an increase in the amount of campaign contributions by an underwriter results in an increase in the likelihood of selection in the absence of a prior underwriting relationship. It also shows that selecting a contributing underwriter through negotiation results in underpricing compared to a non-contributing underwriter. There exists no such difference for bonds issued through the competitive method.
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