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Reasons contextualism.

Brown, Eric.

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Reasons contextualism.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Reasons contextualism./
Author:	Brown, Eric.
Description:	252 p.
Notes:	Adviser: David Rasmussen.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-02A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3207003
ISBN:	9780542553790

Reasons contextualism.
Brown, Eric.

Reasons contextualism. - 252 p.

Adviser: David Rasmussen.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston College, 2006.

My dissertation is an attempt to elucidate the idea of a 'reason' in the normative, practical sense. I argue that Scanlon's buck-passing account of value can be improved in certain ways and offer an 'imbrication version' of the buck-passing account. This account allows that value-properties can be reason-giving properties without abandoning the claim that, in the end, the buck is passed to reasons. I defend Williams' claim that reasons are internal reasons against criticisms from McDowell and Parfit.

ISBN: 9780542553790Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Reasons contextualism.
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020 $a 9780542553790
035 $a (UnM)AAI3207003
035 $a AAI3207003
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Brown, Eric. $3 1269530
245 1 0 $a Reasons contextualism.
300 $a 252 p.
500 $a Adviser: David Rasmussen.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0585.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston College, 2006.
520 $a My dissertation is an attempt to elucidate the idea of a 'reason' in the normative, practical sense. I argue that Scanlon's buck-passing account of value can be improved in certain ways and offer an 'imbrication version' of the buck-passing account. This account allows that value-properties can be reason-giving properties without abandoning the claim that, in the end, the buck is passed to reasons. I defend Williams' claim that reasons are internal reasons against criticisms from McDowell and Parfit.
520 $a There are restrictions other than a connection to A's current motivations, that are necessary for correct reason ascriptions to A. One problem is to understand how we can avoid diluting the notion of A's having a reason to absurdity. Why, for instance, it is absurdly implausible to say, when A is at a party, that A has a reason to bake bread, even if there is a sound deliberative route from her motivations to the conclusion to bake bread? My answer relies on explicating the notion of a context, which can place robust, if contestable, constraints on reason-ascription.
520 $a My discussion rounds off with a further look at the relations between reasons, attitudes, and values. I confront a serious problem for any buck-passing account of value (and similar accounts)---the "wrong kinds of reasons" problem. In what principled way can the buck-passer distinguish between reasons that are of the right kind and reasons that are of the wrong kind to make for value? Consider a case in which an evil demon threatens to punish me if I do not admire him for his own sake. It seems I have a reason to admire the demon, given to me by the demon. The buck-passing account seems to be committed to the claim then, that, by virtue of this, the demon is admirable, which is rather counterintuitive. I argue that all putative "wrong kinds of reasons scenarios" are either absurdities or cases of the right kinds of reasons.
590 $a School code: 0016.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0422
710 2 0 $a Boston College. $3 1017525
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-02A.
790 $a 0016
790 1 0 $a Rasmussen, David, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3207003