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Rationality and the subject's point ...

Smithies, Declan.

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Rationality and the subject's point of view.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Rationality and the subject's point of view./
Author:	Smithies, Declan.
Description:	156 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Paul Boghossian.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-09A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3234182
ISBN:	9780542878022

Rationality and the subject's point of view.
Smithies, Declan.

Rationality and the subject's point of view. - 156 p.

Adviser: Paul Boghossian.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2006.

The aim of the dissertation is to argue that there is an essential connection and rationality and to draw out its implications for the nature of personal level psychology epistemic responsibility and knowledge.

ISBN: 9780542878022Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Rationality and the subject's point of view.
LDR:03062nam 2200325 a 45 001 972252
005 20110927
008 110927s2006 eng d
020 $a 9780542878022
035 $a (UMI)AAI3234182
035 $a AAI3234182
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Smithies, Declan. $3 1296267
245 1 0 $a Rationality and the subject's point of view.
300 $a 156 p.
500 $a Adviser: Paul Boghossian.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-09, Section: A, page: 3435.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2006.
520 $a The aim of the dissertation is to argue that there is an essential connection and rationality and to draw out its implications for the nature of personal level psychology epistemic responsibility and knowledge.
520 $a In Chapter One, I argue for Phenomenal Dependence, which states that what it is rational for the subject to believe depends solely on the phenomenal properties of his mental states. This articulates the insight that rationality is a normative property which is sensitive to the limitations of the subject's point of view on the world.
520 $a In Chapter Two, I argue that Phenomenal Dependence supports a conception of personal level psychology as autonomous from subpersonal level psychology in virtue of being amenable to rational evaluation. I go on to explore various consequences for functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
520 $a In Chapter Three, I argue that Phenomenal Dependence explains the truth of the Reflective Access Requirement, which states that what it is rational for the subject to believe is accessible to the subject by reflection alone. This, in turn, plays a crucial role in making sense of our conception of epistemic responsibility in reflective critical reasoning, which is central to our conception of personhood.
520 $a In Chapter Four, I address the problem of explaining how forming beliefs on the basis of rational methods is conducive to the aim of believing the truth. I argue that it is a "rational presupposition" for any rational method that it is reliable, indeed knowledge-yielding, in the circumstances in which it is employed. I go on to analyze knowledge as belief that is rationally held when all of its rational presuppositions are satisfied.
520 $a In Chapter Five, I argue that this analysis illuminates the value of knowledge by explaining the "anti-luck" intuition that knowledge is incompatible with luck. We value knowledge because it is the kind of cognitive achievement that results when a subject's beliefs achieve the aim of truth in a way that is immune from epistemic luck. I argue that a belief is immune from epistemic luck if and only if it is rationally held when all of its rational presuppositions are satisfied.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0422
710 2 0 $a New York University. $3 515735
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-09A.
790 $a 0146
790 1 0 $a Boghossian, Paul, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3234182