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Information asymmetry and internal m...

Sun, Jianfei.

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Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively?

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively?/
Author:	Sun, Jianfei.
Description:	126 p.
Notes:	Adviser: John Matsusaka.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-10A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Management. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3237732
ISBN:	9780542923999

Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively?
Sun, Jianfei.

Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively? - 126 p.

Adviser: John Matsusaka.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2006.

This paper studies the impact of information asymmetry between blockholders and managers on firm value. The ability of blockholders to effectively monitor managers depends on how informed they are about firms' business. Same-industry (SI) blockholders---blockholders that operate firms in the same line of business as the held firms---are likely to be more informed than blockholders outside the industry, and thus better monitor.

ISBN: 9780542923999Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively?
LDR:02637nam 2200277 a 45 001 971032
005 20110921
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020 $a 9780542923999
035 $a (UMI)AAI3237732
035 $a AAI3237732
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Sun, Jianfei. $3 1295067
245 1 0 $a Information asymmetry and internal monitoring: Which blockholders monitor managers more effectively?
300 $a 126 p.
500 $a Adviser: John Matsusaka.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-10, Section: A, page: 3896.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2006.
520 $a This paper studies the impact of information asymmetry between blockholders and managers on firm value. The ability of blockholders to effectively monitor managers depends on how informed they are about firms' business. Same-industry (SI) blockholders---blockholders that operate firms in the same line of business as the held firms---are likely to be more informed than blockholders outside the industry, and thus better monitor.
520 $a Consistent with this argument, this paper documents the following findings. First, firms with SI blockholders have higher Tobin's Q and lower managerial equity ownership and corporate payout than firms with DI blockholders only, ceteris paribus. The results are robust with control for the endogeneity and causality of SI blockholders. Second, using acquisition data, this paper finds that acquirers with SI blockholders, having higher Tobin's Q, tend to pay less for targets, measured by lower target premium. This results in lower target returns and higher acquirer returns. Third, using the geographic proximity between the SI blockholder and the firm as a measure of information asymmetry, I find that an SI blockholder located closer to the firm has a bigger effect on Tobin's Q than an SI blockholder located far away. Finally, using the block trade data, I find that a higher block trade premium is associated with an SI block buyer than with a DI block buyer, which could mean that the SI blockholder enjoys larger private benefits. I further find that SI blockholders are more likely to become actively involved in firms' management and operation after the block trade transactions. This is consistent with the view that an SI block buyer is able to capture a greater share for firm value.
590 $a School code: 0208.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
690 $a 0454
710 2 0 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-10A.
790 $a 0208
790 1 0 $a Matsusaka, John, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3237732