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Evolutionary games in space.

Kalev-Kronik, Natalie.

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Evolutionary games in space.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Evolutionary games in space./
作者:	Kalev-Kronik, Natalie.
面頁冊數:	76 p.
附註:	Adviser: Yosef Cohen.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-09B.
標題:	Agriculture, Forestry and Wildlife. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3235408
ISBN:	9780542890390

Evolutionary games in space.
Kalev-Kronik, Natalie.

Evolutionary games in space. - 76 p.

Adviser: Yosef Cohen.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2006.

The G-function formalism has been widely used in the context of evolutionary games for identifying evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). This formalism was developed for and applied to point processes. Here, we examine the G-function formalism in the settings of spatial evolutionary games and strategy dynamics, based on reaction-diffusion models. We start by extending the point process maximum principle to reaction-diffusion models with homogeneous, locally stable surfaces. We then develop the strategy dynamics for such surfaces. When the surfaces are locally stable, but not homogenous, the standard definitions of ESS and the maximum principle fall apart. Yet, we show by examples that strategy dynamics leads to convergent stable inhomogeneous strategies that are possibly ESS, in the sense that for many scenarios which we simulated, invaders could not coexist with the exisiting strategies.

ISBN: 9780542890390Subjects--Topical Terms:

783690
Agriculture, Forestry and Wildlife.

Evolutionary games in space.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2006.
520 $a The G-function formalism has been widely used in the context of evolutionary games for identifying evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). This formalism was developed for and applied to point processes. Here, we examine the G-function formalism in the settings of spatial evolutionary games and strategy dynamics, based on reaction-diffusion models. We start by extending the point process maximum principle to reaction-diffusion models with homogeneous, locally stable surfaces. We then develop the strategy dynamics for such surfaces. When the surfaces are locally stable, but not homogenous, the standard definitions of ESS and the maximum principle fall apart. Yet, we show by examples that strategy dynamics leads to convergent stable inhomogeneous strategies that are possibly ESS, in the sense that for many scenarios which we simulated, invaders could not coexist with the exisiting strategies.
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