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Resolving agency conflicts in the pr...

Ding, Fei.

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Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries./
Author:	Ding, Fei.
Description:	96 p.
Notes:	Advisers: Albert S. Kyle; Simon Gervais.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-07A.
Subject:	Economics, Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3270990
ISBN:	9780549109334

Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries.
Ding, Fei.

Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries. - 96 p.

Advisers: Albert S. Kyle; Simon Gervais.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2007.

My dissertation addresses two kinds of agency problems arising from information asymmetries in the economy. For each problem, I derive the optimal contract, analyze the market equilibrium, and discuss important empirical and policy implications using simple game theoretic models.

ISBN: 9780549109334Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries.
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020 $a 9780549109334
035 $a (UMI)AAI3270990
035 $a AAI3270990
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Ding, Fei. $3 1286215
245 1 0 $a Resolving agency conflicts in the presence of information asymmetries.
300 $a 96 p.
500 $a Advisers: Albert S. Kyle; Simon Gervais.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 3065.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2007.
520 $a My dissertation addresses two kinds of agency problems arising from information asymmetries in the economy. For each problem, I derive the optimal contract, analyze the market equilibrium, and discuss important empirical and policy implications using simple game theoretic models.
520 $a This dissertation contains two chapters. In the first chapter, I capture realistic features of the money management industry by modeling the price-setting process of a profit-maximizing broker, who may pay the money manager perquisites ("perks") in exchange for his business. While commissions come directly out of the investor's portfolio, perks only benefit the manager and induce him to trade more. I find the equilibrium contract to be one that is close to being linear in portfolio payoffs. It balances cost minimization and information gathering, and causes the manager to trade excessively. Moreover, as long as perks are not contractible, investors are better off when the brokerage industry is less competitive. Instead of lowering commissions, brokers compete by raising perks and financing them with higher fees.
520 $a In the second chapter, I use a two-period model to study an entrepreneur's employment and collaboration decisions when he has a valuable but easily imitated idea. Under a weak intellectual property rights regime, the entrepreneur trades off the benefit of productivity enhancement that arises from collaborating with an employee in period one against the risk of expropriation associated with employee defection in period two. Two main results are generated. First, softer competition harms the entrepreneur but may improve social welfare, as potential defection creates knowledge spill-over which benefits the whole society. Second, information asymmetry can be a public good. Although informed employees experience underpayment on average due to adverse selection in the labor market, such underpayment strengthens the entrepreneur's incentive to share information in the first place, which results in Pareto-improvements for all parties in the economy.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a Duke University. $3 569686
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 68-07A.
790 $a 0066
790 1 0 $a Gervais, Simon, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Kyle, Albert S., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2007
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3270990