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Institutional ownership stability, f...

Jia, Jingyi.

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Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt./
Author:	Jia, Jingyi.
Description:	173 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Elyas Elyasiani.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-05A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Banking. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3267129
ISBN:	9780549049890

Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt.
Jia, Jingyi.

Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt. - 173 p.

Adviser: Elyas Elyasiani.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2006.

The association between firm performance, the cost of debt and stability of institutional ownership has been overlooked in the literature. To assess these two relationships, I introduce two measures of institutional ownership stability (StdI and IOP) and find following important results: First, there is a positive relationship between firm performance and ownership stability measures in a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms. This result implies that institutional investors who maintain a considerable shareholding over time play an active role in improving firm performance. I also find that long-term investment (R&D expenses/total assets) and executive incentive compensation structure constitute the two channels of this positive effect.

ISBN: 9780549049890Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt.
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020 $a 9780549049890
035 $a (UMI)AAI3267129
035 $a AAI3267129
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Jia, Jingyi. $3 1286195
245 1 0 $a Institutional ownership stability, firm performance, and the cost of debt.
300 $a 173 p.
500 $a Adviser: Elyas Elyasiani.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-05, Section: A, page: 2047.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2006.
520 $a The association between firm performance, the cost of debt and stability of institutional ownership has been overlooked in the literature. To assess these two relationships, I introduce two measures of institutional ownership stability (StdI and IOP) and find following important results: First, there is a positive relationship between firm performance and ownership stability measures in a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms. This result implies that institutional investors who maintain a considerable shareholding over time play an active role in improving firm performance. I also find that long-term investment (R&D expenses/total assets) and executive incentive compensation structure constitute the two channels of this positive effect.
520 $a Second, this study documents that institutional ownership stability plays an important role in determining the cost of debt financing. After controlling for previously identified determinants of the cost of debt, I find a significant and robust negative relationship between institutional ownership stability and the cost of debt. Moreover, Institutional ownership stability is found to be more important in determining the cost of debt than the institutional ownership level, commonly used in the literature. In terms of channels, I find evidence that stable institutional ownership reduces the cost of debt by mitigating agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders, shareholders and managers, and information asymmetry problem.
520 $a Third, the effect of institutional ownership stability on the performance of banking holding companies (BHCs) is investigated and contrasted to the effects found for industrial and utility firms. The relationship between BHC performance and ownership stability is positive but weaker than that prevailing for the industrial firms with similar equity market value, share price and trading venue. The weaker relationship for BHCs is not due to prevalence of more intense information asymmetry in banking, it is rather due to the substitution of regulation for owner monitoring. The link between performance and ownership stability is stronger in the post interstate banking legislation (1994) years. This link is also stronger for BHCs with lower default risk and higher book capital ratios. These results suggest that institutional ownership and regulation are substitute forms of monitoring in the highly regulated banking industry.
590 $a School code: 0225.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a Temple University. $3 959342
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 68-05A.
790 $a 0225
790 1 0 $a Elyasiani, Elyas, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3267129