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Governing the fishing commons: Insti...

Brewer, Jennifer F.

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Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish./
Author:	Brewer, Jennifer F.
Description:	277 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Dianne Rocheleau.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-03A.
Subject:	Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3255014

Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish.
Brewer, Jennifer F.

Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish. - 277 p.

Adviser: Dianne Rocheleau.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clark University, 2007.

This dissertation joins three overlapping case studies to answer principal research questions: What limitations of classically liberal and common property models of environmental governance are evident in the cases of groundfish and lobster management in the state of Maine? As liberal models overlay common property institutions in the lobster case, what changes occur in boundaries of, and access to, civic deliberation and the public sphere?Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020913
Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture.

Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish.
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005 20110830
008 110831s2007 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
035 $a (UMI)AAI3255014
035 $a AAI3255014
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Brewer, Jennifer F. $3 1285212
245 1 0 $a Governing the fishing commons: Institutions, ecosystems and democracy in the co-management of Maine lobster and groundfish.
300 $a 277 p.
500 $a Adviser: Dianne Rocheleau.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-03, Section: A, page: 1115.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Clark University, 2007.
520 $a This dissertation joins three overlapping case studies to answer principal research questions: What limitations of classically liberal and common property models of environmental governance are evident in the cases of groundfish and lobster management in the state of Maine? As liberal models overlay common property institutions in the lobster case, what changes occur in boundaries of, and access to, civic deliberation and the public sphere?
520 $a The first case study describes the inability of single species privatization agendas to accommodate ecologically adaptive flexibility in Maine's groundfishing fleet. A classically liberal paradigm asserts market approaches to resource sustainability, supplemented by civil society as mediator between citizens and government. This overlooks important feedback mechanisms including information sharing and accountability. Multi-species livelihood strategies are jeopardized. Broader policy deliberation could yield more place-based and socio-ecologically sustainable outcomes.
520 $a The second case study finds that permeable boundaries across marine ecosystems, and socio-economic networks, challenge tenets of common property theory. Clear and discrete boundaries of resources and resource users may be neither possible nor desirable. Fuzzy, broadly negotiated, informal boundaries characterize Maine's lobster fishery. Under co-management, these are overlaid by more rigid, state sanctioned boundaries. Outcomes are mixed and unanticipated.
520 $a The third case study notes that state-led innovations in public participation can erode customary and communitarian deliberations around resource access. In the lobster case, spheres of civic discourse narrow, as does the range of social interests considered in limiting fishery entry. Kin-based households, informal harbor groups, and the state legislature relinquish decision making authority as individual fishermen and administrative agencies gain formal legitimacy. Contested public-private boundaries shift, consolidate, and are more entrained by capital interests.
520 $a The evidence suggests that socio-ecological complexity challenges prevailing paradigms of environmental governance, and that broad deliberation and accountability can improve policy effectiveness. Observations crossing literatures in cultural-political ecology, resource geography, governance and institutions, common property and deliberative democracy emphasize inter-institutional and inter-scalar dynamics. Policy implications include prospects for ecosystem based management, public participation, decision support, marine protected areas and roles of non-governmental organizations. The study demonstrates that human-environment geography is well positioned to assist further multidisciplinary work in fisheries and marine policy.
590 $a School code: 0048.
650 4 $a Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture. $3 1020913
650 4 $a Anthropology, Cultural. $3 735016
650 4 $a Geography. $3 524010
690 $a 0326
690 $a 0366
690 $a 0792
710 2 $a Clark University. $3 1017690
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 68-03A.
790 $a 0048
790 1 0 $a Rocheleau, Dianne, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2007
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3255014