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Mathematical models of discriminatio...

Fryer, Roland Gerard, Jr.

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Mathematical models of discrimination and inequality.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Mathematical models of discrimination and inequality./
作者:	Fryer, Roland Gerard, Jr.
面頁冊數:	162 p.
附註:	Adviser: Tomas J. Sjostrom.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-05A.
標題:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3051651
ISBN:	0493669337

Mathematical models of discrimination and inequality.
Fryer, Roland Gerard, Jr.

Mathematical models of discrimination and inequality. - 162 p.

Adviser: Tomas J. Sjostrom.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2002.

This thesis applies game theory to discrimination and inequality. Too often, the analyses of these subjects are bent around personal ideology and political interest. This thesis represents a dispassionate analysis of these controversial topics by applying rigorous techniques within formal models. The first essay, introduces the notion of “cultural capital” into economic analysis. The second chapter extends the theory of statistical discrimination in a non-trivial manner, that calls into question the robustness of equilibria found in Arrow's (1973) static model. The final essay constructs a theoretical model of firms' auditing processes with respect to anti-discrimination policies.

ISBN: 0493669337Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

Mathematical models of discrimination and inequality.
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300 $a 162 p.
500 $a Adviser: Tomas J. Sjostrom.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-05, Section: A, page: 1940.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2002.
520 $a This thesis applies game theory to discrimination and inequality. Too often, the analyses of these subjects are bent around personal ideology and political interest. This thesis represents a dispassionate analysis of these controversial topics by applying rigorous techniques within formal models. The first essay, introduces the notion of “cultural capital” into economic analysis. The second chapter extends the theory of statistical discrimination in a non-trivial manner, that calls into question the robustness of equilibria found in Arrow's (1973) static model. The final essay constructs a theoretical model of firms' auditing processes with respect to anti-discrimination policies.
520 $a Many economically relevant decisions are driven, in part, by social and cultural factors. “<italic>Cultural Capital</italic>” introduces cultural capital into economic reasoning. We model this as an infinitely repeated game in which the probability of continuation play (e.g. discount factor) is a function of culturally specific investments made by the agents before the interactions begin. Using this simple approach, we show that: (1) some individuals subject to culturally specific unproductive investments are worse off than others in cultures that do not require such investments; (2) as the value of human capital increases, the wage inequality for those who get out of the community increases relative to those who are left behind; (3) popular policy prescriptions such as education initiatives, affirmative action, and diversity programs can have unintuitive results when cultural capital is brought into economic reasoning. This new theory, and its testable implications provide new and interesting results that apply to many ethnic, racial, and religious groups. The literatures involving statistical discrimination share a common theme. This theme suggests that there exists discriminatory equilibria in which a group is “disadvantaged” relative to another. “Toward a Dynamic Theory of Statistical Discrimination” explores what happens to the disadvantaged individuals who overcome the initial discrimination.
520 $a The current auditing literature assumes that the auditor has perfect information after she conducts an audit. However, in some economic applications, this assumption is not realistic. In “Implicit Quotas”, a theoretical model is constructed in which an auditor has imperfect information about an agent's actions, even after an audit. For concreteness, the model is applied to the labor market (where quotas are perhaps most controversial) in which employers are audited regarding anti-discrimination policies, thought the theoretical specification can be readily used in many economic applications. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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791 $a Ph.D.
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