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Goethe's phenomenology of nature and...

Calabro, Robert Joseph.

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Goethe's phenomenology of nature and Husserl's transcendental subjectivity: Seeing the dangers of abstraction (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edmund Husserl).

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Goethe's phenomenology of nature and Husserl's transcendental subjectivity: Seeing the dangers of abstraction (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edmund Husserl)./
作者:	Calabro, Robert Joseph.
面頁冊數:	190 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-03, Section: A, page: 0970.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-03A
標題:	Philosophy -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3048102
ISBN:	0493623760

Goethe's phenomenology of nature and Husserl's transcendental subjectivity: Seeing the dangers of abstraction (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edmund Husserl).
Calabro, Robert Joseph.

Goethe's phenomenology of nature and Husserl's transcendental subjectivity: Seeing the dangers of abstraction (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edmund Husserl). - 190 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-03, Section: A, page: 0970.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2002.

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: (1) To demonstrate a process whereby phenomena are “drawn-out” from their experiential ground, placed within a mathematical-causal structure, and then used to formulate scientific theories. This transposition of ideal forms for concrete reality takes the “constituted” forms as the basis for scientific knowledge. the natural world are filtered out of this mathematical-causal matrix. The danger arises when the subject becomes objectified, which leads to alienation from our own knowledge, and from one another as well. Reality, however, is neither “objective” nor “subjective,” but experiential, with the terms “objective” and “subjective” being examine the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, especially his concept of intentionality, as a way to expand our narrow definition of reason to include human experience. This method is “transcendental” to cultural norms, which means that it establishes the structural conditions that make our knowledge of the world possible. Husserl's phenomenological method is then applied to Goethe's epistemology, providing a philosophical basis for Goethe's scientific methodology. It is argued here that Goethe took the first steps toward a rigorous way of knowing grounded in human experience, pointing toward an epistemology method, Goethe's scientific method and experiments can be more clearly seen through the light of experience

ISBN: 0493623760Subjects--Topical Terms:

550317
Philosophy

Goethe's phenomenology of nature and Husserl's transcendental subjectivity: Seeing the dangers of abstraction (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edmund Husserl).
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520 $a The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: (1) To demonstrate a process whereby phenomena are “drawn-out” from their experiential ground, placed within a mathematical-causal structure, and then used to formulate scientific theories. This transposition of ideal forms for concrete reality takes the “constituted” forms as the basis for scientific knowledge. the natural world are filtered out of this mathematical-causal matrix. The danger arises when the subject becomes objectified, which leads to alienation from our own knowledge, and from one another as well. Reality, however, is neither “objective” nor “subjective,” but experiential, with the terms “objective” and “subjective” being examine the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, especially his concept of intentionality, as a way to expand our narrow definition of reason to include human experience. This method is “transcendental” to cultural norms, which means that it establishes the structural conditions that make our knowledge of the world possible. Husserl's phenomenological method is then applied to Goethe's epistemology, providing a philosophical basis for Goethe's scientific methodology. It is argued here that Goethe took the first steps toward a rigorous way of knowing grounded in human experience, pointing toward an epistemology method, Goethe's scientific method and experiments can be more clearly seen through the light of experience
520 $a The conclusion drawn is that consciousness evidences “intentionality” and therefore has the capacity for a more immediate way of knowing. This way of knowing more accurately reflects our qualitative experiences. With Goethe's method, these qualitative experiences can be placed within a scientific framework without being objectified. Goethe's scientific methodology opens up the possibility for us to get “back to things themselves,” and to ground our knowledge in human experience. While the focus here is on epistemology in the natural sciences, implications for the social sciences and humanities are discussed as well
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