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Labor strength and informational asy...

Hilary, Gilles.

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Labor strength and informational asymmetry in the stock market.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Labor strength and informational asymmetry in the stock market./
作者:	Hilary, Gilles.
面頁冊數:	111 p.
附註:	Adviser: Raymond Ball.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-07A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3060221
ISBN:	0493758100

Labor strength and informational asymmetry in the stock market.
Hilary, Gilles.

Labor strength and informational asymmetry in the stock market. - 111 p.

Adviser: Raymond Ball.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2002.

The empirical literature in labor relations suggests that providing information to labor is costly to the firm. An explanation consistent with this result is that, when management is facing strong labor, the tension between financial markets and labor leads to more uncertainty about its reporting goals. Theory suggests that the option to bias reporting is more valuable when the recipient is unsure of the manager's goal. Therefore, management has a greater interest in this case in reducing disclosure to protect this option. In turn, a decrease in disclosure should increase the bid-ask spread. Consistent with this prediction, empirical results indicate a positive relation between labor strength and spreads.

ISBN: 0493758100Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Labor strength and informational asymmetry in the stock market.
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520 $a The empirical literature in labor relations suggests that providing information to labor is costly to the firm. An explanation consistent with this result is that, when management is facing strong labor, the tension between financial markets and labor leads to more uncertainty about its reporting goals. Theory suggests that the option to bias reporting is more valuable when the recipient is unsure of the manager's goal. Therefore, management has a greater interest in this case in reducing disclosure to protect this option. In turn, a decrease in disclosure should increase the bid-ask spread. Consistent with this prediction, empirical results indicate a positive relation between labor strength and spreads.
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