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Essays in the economics of education...

Ding, Weili.

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Essays in the economics of education (China).

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in the economics of education (China)./
Author:	Ding, Weili.
Description:	121 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Thomas G. Rawski.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-10A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3066945
ISBN:	0493863540

Essays in the economics of education (China).
Ding, Weili.

Essays in the economics of education (China). - 121 p.

Adviser: Thomas G. Rawski.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2002.

Many believe that the ills of public schools are unique to their own community or country. Yet many problems such as whether to stream or mix students of different abilities in classrooms, where lies the benefit of reducing class sizes, how to evaluate the performance of schools, and the recruitment, retention and improvement of competent teachers afflict government-run educational institutions worldwide. This dissertation presents new evidence on a variety of open questions in the economics of education literature and make use of a unique dataset I collected from a county in China's Jiangsu Province.

ISBN: 0493863540Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays in the economics of education (China).
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035 $a (UnM)AAI3066945
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040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Ding, Weili. $3 1259294
245 1 0 $a Essays in the economics of education (China).
300 $a 121 p.
500 $a Adviser: Thomas G. Rawski.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-10, Section: A, page: 3644.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2002.
520 $a Many believe that the ills of public schools are unique to their own community or country. Yet many problems such as whether to stream or mix students of different abilities in classrooms, where lies the benefit of reducing class sizes, how to evaluate the performance of schools, and the recruitment, retention and improvement of competent teachers afflict government-run educational institutions worldwide. This dissertation presents new evidence on a variety of open questions in the economics of education literature and make use of a unique dataset I collected from a county in China's Jiangsu Province.
520 $a Peer effects have figured prominently in debates on school vouchers, desegregation, ability tracking and anti-poverty programs. Compelling evidence of their existence remains scarce for plaguing endogeneity issues such as selection bias and the reflection problem. In chapter one, we are among the first to firmly establish the link between peer performance and student achievement. We find strong evidence that peer effects exist and operate in a positive and nonlinear manner, and that reducing the variation of peer performance increases achievement. Our semi-parametric estimates clarify the trade-offs facing policy makers in exploiting positive peer effects to increase future achievement.
520 $a Different statistical models are commonly used to provide empirical evidence as to the effects of teachers, schools and other inputs on cognitive achievement, including peer effects. In chapter two, we establish the relation between these models and the underlying theory of cognitive development, illustrating various estimation problems. We study the Tennessee class size experiment to compare the performance of these models and our proposed semiparametric estimator.
520 $a Chapter three investigates incentive pay for teachers. Compensation for teachers is traditionally tied to extrinsic measures of teacher quality such as teaching experience or education. There is growing interest in linking teacher salary to measures of teacher performance. We demonstrate using a theoretical model that incentive contracts based on both objective and subjective performance evaluations can mitigate undesired behaviors such as “teaching toward tests.” The examination of China's performance based compensation system finds that it has many desirable features and may hold lessons for other countries.
590 $a School code: 0178.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0510
710 2 0 $a University of Pittsburgh. $3 958527
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 63-10A.
790 $a 0178
790 1 0 $a Rawski, Thomas G., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2002
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3066945