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CEO compensation in Japan.

Snider, Helen K.

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CEO compensation in Japan.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	CEO compensation in Japan./
Author:	Snider, Helen K.
Description:	59 p.
Notes:	Adviser: George Sorter.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-12A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9999224
ISBN:	0493072381

CEO compensation in Japan.
Snider, Helen K.

CEO compensation in Japan. - 59 p.

Adviser: George Sorter.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2001.

The pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Japan is systematically associated with both firm characteristics and individual attributes as invoked from agency theory and human capital theory. The results indicate that continuous monitoring by the main bank and other member firms of the same business group contributes to aligning the interests of Japanese CEOs with those of outside shareholders through an enhanced sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Furthermore, pay-performance sensitivity is greater for <italic> keiretsu</italic> firms with close ties to their main banks and other member firms. In addition, the CEO's tenure positively influences pay-performance sensitivity.

ISBN: 0493072381Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

CEO compensation in Japan.
LDR:01616nam 2200301 a 45 001 930514
005 20110429
008 110429s2001 eng d
020 $a 0493072381
035 $a (UnM)AAI9999224
035 $a AAI9999224
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Snider, Helen K. $3 1254074
245 1 0 $a CEO compensation in Japan.
300 $a 59 p.
500 $a Adviser: George Sorter.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-12, Section: A, page: 4885.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 2001.
520 $a The pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in Japan is systematically associated with both firm characteristics and individual attributes as invoked from agency theory and human capital theory. The results indicate that continuous monitoring by the main bank and other member firms of the same business group contributes to aligning the interests of Japanese CEOs with those of outside shareholders through an enhanced sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance. Furthermore, pay-performance sensitivity is greater for <italic> keiretsu</italic> firms with close ties to their main banks and other member firms. In addition, the CEO's tenure positively influences pay-performance sensitivity.
590 $a School code: 0868.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0272
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0510
710 2 0 $a New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration. $3 1025676
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 61-12A.
790 $a 0868
790 1 0 $a Sorter, George, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9999224