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Static pricing in multiple-service n...

DaSilva, Luiz A.

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Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis./
Author:	DaSilva, Luiz A.
Description:	154 p.
Notes:	Adviser: David W. Petr.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-05B.
Subject:	Engineering, Electronics and Electrical. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9931914
ISBN:	0599319143

Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis.
DaSilva, Luiz A.

Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis. - 154 p.

Adviser: David W. Petr.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kansas, 1998.

Some of the formal results of our analysis are combined with heuristic arguments in order to discuss guidelines for pricing of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) services.

ISBN: 0599319143Subjects--Topical Terms:

626636
Engineering, Electronics and Electrical.

Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis.
LDR:03317nam 2200349 a 45 001 929630
005 20110427
008 110427s1998 eng d
020 $a 0599319143
035 $a (UnM)AAI9931914
035 $a AAI9931914
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a DaSilva, Luiz A. $3 1253117
245 1 0 $a Static pricing in multiple-service networks: A game-theoretic analysis.
300 $a 154 p.
500 $a Adviser: David W. Petr.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-05, Section: B, page: 2256.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kansas, 1998.
520 $a Some of the formal results of our analysis are combined with heuristic arguments in order to discuss guidelines for pricing of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) services.
520 $a The problem of pricing for multi-service networks is a complex one, involving economic, marketing and engineering considerations. We describe some of the limitations of our model, and in doing so suggest areas where further research would be useful.
520 $a The promise of a Broadband Integrated Services Digital Network (BISDN) is gradually becoming a reality. Integrated networks cater to diverse application requirements, and an efficient solution to the problem of providing adequate quality of service (QoS) to heterogeneous users is through the offer of multiple service classes.
520 $a In this dissertation, we study static pricing policies for multi-service networks. We demonstrate that, by adopting an appropriate pricing policy, the service provider is able to offer the necessary incentives for each user to choose the service that best matches her needs, thereby discouraging over-allocation of resources and maximizing social welfare. Furthermore, by indirectly revealing their QoS or resource requirements, users provide information that is of great value to the traffic management task.
520 $a We adopt a game-theoretic approach to the problem in order to take into account the interdependence among users' service choices. In this framework, the provider will induce one or more Nash equilibria according to the network architecture, total resources available and the pricing policy adopted.
520 $a Two distinct service architectures are considered here: in priority-based networks, users choose the priority level to be assigned to their traffic; in allocation-based networks, users request that a certain amount of a resource (typically, bandwidth) be allocated to their calls. In both cases, one can find static pricing policies that a network provider can use to take advantage of the structure of the network in order to benefit all users according to their sensitivity to QoS.
520 $a Results pertaining to the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for each problem are presented. The problem of determining this equilibrium is stated as a series of coupled nonlinear programs. For the sake of concreteness, we postulate some utility functions and determine what the induced equilibria are.
590 $a School code: 0099.
650 4 $a Engineering, Electronics and Electrical. $3 626636
650 4 $a Engineering, System Science. $3 1018128
690 $a 0544
690 $a 0790
710 2 0 $a University of Kansas. $3 626626
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 60-05B.
790 $a 0099
790 1 0 $a Petr, David W., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9931914