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Earnings management by merger target...

Bettinghaus, Bruce Alan.

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Earnings management by merger targets: Discretion over the loan loss provision in commercial banks.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Earnings management by merger targets: Discretion over the loan loss provision in commercial banks./
作者:	Bettinghaus, Bruce Alan.
面頁冊數:	68 p.
附註:	Adviser: Anne L. Beatty.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-05A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3016196
ISBN:	0493264574

Earnings management by merger targets: Discretion over the loan loss provision in commercial banks.
Bettinghaus, Bruce Alan.

Earnings management by merger targets: Discretion over the loan loss provision in commercial banks. - 68 p.

Adviser: Anne L. Beatty.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2000.

This paper investigates the relationship between commercial banks' accrual choices and the likelihood of their takeover. I study a sample of 2,414 commercial bank holding companies (banks) over the period of 1987 through 1998. The sample consists of 14,574 bank-years. I perform two complimentary tests to determine if the targets in bank mergers are managing their loan loss provision downward in the period prior to the merger. In the first test, I select a sample of 641 bank-years for banks in the year before they are the targets in a merger. I test for the mean difference in the loan loss provision between these target-banks and the rest of the sample after controlling for the economic determinants of the loan loss provision. I find that both public and private intrastate targets as well as private interstate targets all demonstrate a negative unexpected loan loss provision during a time-period where there is a high probability of takeover. I do not find an earnings management difference between public and private targets. In the second test, I select a sample of 116 target banks that continue to be reported as a subsidiary to their new parent. I test for a negative (positive) unexpected loan loss provision prior to (after) the merger. There is some evidence that these targets do have a negative provision prior to the merger, but they do not exhibit the expected reversing behavior.

ISBN: 0493264574Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Earnings management by merger targets: Discretion over the loan loss provision in commercial banks.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2000.
520 $a This paper investigates the relationship between commercial banks' accrual choices and the likelihood of their takeover. I study a sample of 2,414 commercial bank holding companies (banks) over the period of 1987 through 1998. The sample consists of 14,574 bank-years. I perform two complimentary tests to determine if the targets in bank mergers are managing their loan loss provision downward in the period prior to the merger. In the first test, I select a sample of 641 bank-years for banks in the year before they are the targets in a merger. I test for the mean difference in the loan loss provision between these target-banks and the rest of the sample after controlling for the economic determinants of the loan loss provision. I find that both public and private intrastate targets as well as private interstate targets all demonstrate a negative unexpected loan loss provision during a time-period where there is a high probability of takeover. I do not find an earnings management difference between public and private targets. In the second test, I select a sample of 116 target banks that continue to be reported as a subsidiary to their new parent. I test for a negative (positive) unexpected loan loss provision prior to (after) the merger. There is some evidence that these targets do have a negative provision prior to the merger, but they do not exhibit the expected reversing behavior.
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