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The design and outcomes of reward st...

Elvira, Marta Maria.

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The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives./
Author:	Elvira, Marta Maria.
Description:	312 p.
Notes:	Chair: Trond K. Peterson.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International57-03A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Management. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9621125

The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives.
Elvira, Marta Maria.

The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives. - 312 p.

Chair: Trond K. Peterson.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1995.

This dissertation investigates the design of rewards and their effects on employee wage and promotion outcomes. It builds upon incentive pay models, expands them to include career incentives, and applies them to different occupations. Predictions of agency and power theories are derived and tested combining econometric analyses with qualitative methods. Analyses are based on interviews, documents, and employee wage and career data from a large organization.Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives.
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005 20110422
008 110422s1995 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI9621125
035 $a AAI9621125
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Elvira, Marta Maria. $3 1250382
245 1 0 $a The design and outcomes of reward structures: Integrating agency and power explanations of incentives.
300 $a 312 p.
500 $a Chair: Trond K. Peterson.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 57-03, Section: A, page: 1217.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1995.
520 $a This dissertation investigates the design of rewards and their effects on employee wage and promotion outcomes. It builds upon incentive pay models, expands them to include career incentives, and applies them to different occupations. Predictions of agency and power theories are derived and tested combining econometric analyses with qualitative methods. Analyses are based on interviews, documents, and employee wage and career data from a large organization.
520 $a The process of designing reward structures is documented. The assumption of strategic rationality proper to economic frameworks is contrasted with power arguments by examining how individuals within differently powerful business units and occupations influence the design of compensation. Evidence from this organization indicates that compensation managers often make decisions based on limited performance information and within constrained time periods. This evidence suggests that bounded rationality should be given serious consideration in modeling agency relationships and invites further examination of the assumption that personnel managers control the design of human resource structures.
520 $a Risk-sharing consequences and the tradeoff between the insurance provision and the incentive provision in employment contracts are examined to determine if there is a tradeoff between pay components (i.e., base salary and bonus). Additionally, the proposition that implicit and explicit rewards are traded off in employment contracts is tested. Finally, the tenet of incentive alignment is tested by examining the relationship between performance and rewards. The firm's incentive mechanisms (bonus, base salary, merit raises, and promotion) are responsive to performance, but no tradeoffs in rewarding performance are found.
520 $a Observed incentive structures lend only limited support to agency models, in which contracts optimize long-term and short-term employment rewards. The results show different reward tradeoff patterns for different occupations. In occupations where career progression is organizationally bound (managers), employees who earn incentive pay also earn higher base salary and have a higher likelihood of promotion, especially those in high job ranks. In occupations where advancement relates to external market power (professionals), rewards are allocated more equitably, regardless of job rank and pay method. Therefore, qualitative and quantitative results suggest that power is an intervening factor mediating how economic considerations enter employment contracts.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Management. $3 626628
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
650 4 $a Psychology, Industrial. $3 520063
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0510
690 $a 0624
710 2 0 $a University of California, Berkeley. $3 687832
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 57-03A.
790 $a 0028
790 1 0 $a Peterson, Trond K., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1995
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9621125