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Credit risk, discrimination, and reg...

The University of Chicago.

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Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets./
作者:	Han, Song.
面頁冊數:	160 p.
附註:	Adviser: Casey B. Mulligan.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International59-07A.
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9841524
ISBN:	9780591957082

Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets.
Han, Song.

Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets. - 160 p.

Adviser: Casey B. Mulligan.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1998.

In this dissertation a unified framework is developed for theoretical and quantitative analysis of both statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination in credit markets. Statistical discrimination occurs when creditors apply the statistical correlations between group identity and credit risks to individual applicants. Creditor's tastes for discrimination are modeled by psychic costs in contacting with minorities. A credit market equilibrium is characterized by Pareto optimal allocations of funds.

ISBN: 9780591957082Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets.
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245 1 0 $a Credit risk, discrimination, and regulation in credit markets.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1998.
520 $a In this dissertation a unified framework is developed for theoretical and quantitative analysis of both statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination in credit markets. Statistical discrimination occurs when creditors apply the statistical correlations between group identity and credit risks to individual applicants. Creditor's tastes for discrimination are modeled by psychic costs in contacting with minorities. A credit market equilibrium is characterized by Pareto optimal allocations of funds.
520 $a I study the economic consequences of credit risks and creditor's preferences on screening, contract terms, and expected loan performance in perfect competitive credit markets. I show that whether the conventional hypothesis that loans to minority debtors are more profitable than to majorities with comparable credit background is valid and/or unique to taste-based discrimination depends crucially on how to measure expected loan profitability, the particular model of creditor's preferences, and the particular segments of debtors.
520 $a Several testable hypotheses are derived on detecting taste-based discrimination. Using a data on FHA mortgage loans, I test the hypothesis that for the "over-qualified" debtors, if loans to minority debtors have lower conditional expected write-offs than to majorities with the same unprohibited variables at the loan originations, then there exists taste-based discrimination against minorities. Empirical evidence fails to reject the null hypothesis of non-existence of taste-based discrimination.
590 $a School code: 0330.
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650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Sociology, Ethnic and Racial Studies. $3 1017474
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