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Do investment banks take their own a...

University of Kentucky.

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Do investment banks take their own advice?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Do investment banks take their own advice?/
作者:	Wu, Qun.
面頁冊數:	109 p.
附註:	Advisers: Bradford D. Jordan; Richard W. Furst; Janis H. Furst.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-05A.
標題:	Business Administration, Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3315038
ISBN:	9780549643531

Do investment banks take their own advice?
Wu, Qun.

Do investment banks take their own advice? - 109 p.

Advisers: Bradford D. Jordan; Richard W. Furst; Janis H. Furst.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kentucky, 2008.

KEYWORDS: Earnings Forecast, Conflicts of Interest, Investment Bank, Institutional Investor, Portfolio Weight

ISBN: 9780549643531Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Do investment banks take their own advice?
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100 1 $a Wu, Qun. $3 1057556
245 1 0 $a Do investment banks take their own advice?
300 $a 109 p.
500 $a Advisers: Bradford D. Jordan; Richard W. Furst; Janis H. Furst.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1920.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kentucky, 2008.
520 $a KEYWORDS: Earnings Forecast, Conflicts of Interest, Investment Bank, Institutional Investor, Portfolio Weight
520 $a Whether and how conflicts of interest affect the usefulness of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate, and evidence to date is mixed. I adopt a unique research design to identify the usefulness of research reports by analysts affiliated with investment banks. Specifically, I investigate how institutional investors affiliated with investment banks use earnings forecast revisions from sell-side analysts that are affiliated with the same investment banks. The results of this dissertation can be summarized as follows.
520 $a First, I find that bank-affiliated institutional investors use upward revisions by sell-side analysts. Moreover, the evidence shows that these institutional investors respond more strongly to the upward revisions from analysts affiliated with their own investment banks. The results hold for the subsamples of unique upward revisions and revisions issued by underwriters for the covered company in the past twenty-four months. This provides the evidence for the investment value of upward revisions in the eyes of sophisticated institutional investors. Second, I find that institutional investors decrease their portfolio weights in the quarter surrounding a downward revision. For the full sample of downward revisions and the subsample of unique downward revisions, there are no significant differences between holding changes of affiliated institutional investors and those of institutions not affiliated with the investment bank that issues a given downward revision. For the subsample of downward revisions issued by an underwriter, institutional investors affiliated with the underwriter decrease their holdings significantly more than other investors. Overall, this study suggests that investment banks do take their own advice. The conflicts of interest, if there are any, do not seem to invalidate the usefulness of analyst forecasts.
590 $a School code: 0102.
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650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
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