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Dynamic competition of two-sided pla...

Stanford University.

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Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies./
作者:	Chen, Kai.
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Adviser: Edison Tse.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International68-11A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3292329
ISBN:	9780549353621

Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies.
Chen, Kai.

Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies. - 143 p.

Adviser: Edison Tse.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.

This dissertation seeks to explore dynamic outcomes of platform competitions, dynamic pricing behaviors, and various strategic decisions in two-sided markets characterized by bilateral network effects by using dynamic approaches.

ISBN: 9780549353621Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies.
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245 1 0 $a Dynamic competition of two-sided platforms: Differentiation, pricing, and strategies.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.
520 $a This dissertation seeks to explore dynamic outcomes of platform competitions, dynamic pricing behaviors, and various strategic decisions in two-sided markets characterized by bilateral network effects by using dynamic approaches.
520 $a I posit dynamic system models in different market microstructures incorporating horizontal differentiation of competing platforms and user heterogeneity to determine the possible outcomes of platform competitions in various two-sided markets, and explain why some two-sided markets exhibit "winner-takes-all" dynamics while multiple platforms prevail in some others. The findings suggest that in addition to multi-homing tendency, market segmentation is another determining factor whether or not a two-sided market is destined to be served by a single platform. In particular, for the competing platforms that provide differentiated products or services that can secure them an exclusive segment on the single-homing side(s), if any, of the market, they may coexist in the market regardless of the opponents' market positions. Those models and their extensions may be applied to interpret interesting outcomes of various technology standard competitions and format wars. A case study on computer operating systems with casual empiricism is discussed. I also present some implications on late comer strategies. Step-by-step guidelines for new comers entering into different two-sided markets where there is a dominant incumbent are discussed. I also take a closer look at the emerging telematics market. Strategic implications for leading telematics service providers such as GM's OnStar are suggested.
520 $a Also, I use an optimal control model to solve the dynamic optimal pricing path of a two-sided platform. From various results by numerical method, I explain the interesting phenomenon existing in many two-sided markets that one side can be rationally priced lower, sometimes at or even below cost. I identify several important factors in diffusion dynamics such as sensitivity to group size on the other side, sensitivity to price, diffusion speed, marginal cost, and captive user population, and illustrated how each of them may influence the pricing structure by comparative results. To determine which side to subsidize, a platform needs to factor in all those parameters in the diffusion dynamics carefully. Similar markets may exhibit opposite pricing structures. Even platforms in one market may have different or even opposite pricing structures. Pricing strategy can be used to conquer "Chicken and Egg" problem in two-sided market. However, subsidizing the side with deficiency in installed base should only be temporary in the entry phase while other factors in the diffusion may lead to subsidizing one side into perpetuity. The results not only provide several basic pricing principles for a two-sided platform, but also shed light on how a platform may benefit from different strategic moves. Strategic actions in one side generally influence the pricing structure of both sides. Platforms may adopt one or more strategic moves to manipulate the pricing structure to accelerate growth, increase profit, and/or build entry barrier on one or both sides of the market. Casual empiricism observed in many two-sided markets is quite encouraging.
520 $a Finally, I posit differential game approach to again model the platform competitions in various market contexts. The results on long term dynamic growth of platform competitions echo the previous findings. Segmentation in single-homing side(s) is the key for multiple platforms to coexist in a two-sided market. Introducing competition, I also conduct comparative statics results to show that basic pricing principles for a monopolist still hold in a duopoly competition setting. In addition, I examine the impacts of cross-price sensitivity between the competing platforms and single/multi-homing tendency when deciding cross-subsidization between the two sides. A platform's pricing decision also has influence on its opponent's pricing structure. Furthermore, I find platform competition and multi-homing tendency has some ambiguous consequences on the overall pricing level.
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791 $a Ph.D.
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