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The effects of employer-sponsored re...

University of California, Berkeley.

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The effects of employer-sponsored retirement programs on savings and retirement behavior.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The effects of employer-sponsored retirement programs on savings and retirement behavior./
作者:	Brown, Kristine Megan.
面頁冊數:	135 p.
附註:	Adviser: Emmanuel Saez.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-06A.
標題:	Economics, Labor. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3317662
ISBN:	9780549653127

The effects of employer-sponsored retirement programs on savings and retirement behavior.
Brown, Kristine Megan.

The effects of employer-sponsored retirement programs on savings and retirement behavior. - 135 p.

Adviser: Emmanuel Saez.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2008.

This dissertation examines the effects of both the financial and non-financial characteristics of employer-sponsored retirement programs on individual retirement timing and retirement savings. Using quasi-experimental approaches and unique data sources, I examine the impact of the strong financial incentives of a traditional pension on retirement timing and the effect of 401(k) administrative processes on pre-retirement distribution decisions.

ISBN: 9780549653127Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019135
Economics, Labor.

The effects of employer-sponsored retirement programs on savings and retirement behavior.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-06, Section: A, page: 2393.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2008.
520 $a This dissertation examines the effects of both the financial and non-financial characteristics of employer-sponsored retirement programs on individual retirement timing and retirement savings. Using quasi-experimental approaches and unique data sources, I examine the impact of the strong financial incentives of a traditional pension on retirement timing and the effect of 401(k) administrative processes on pre-retirement distribution decisions.
520 $a In the first chapter of this dissertation, I use the variation created by a major, unanticipated reform of the pension program for California teachers to provide quasi-experimental evidence on the link between pension generosity and retirement timing. I use a large aggregate administrative dataset to conduct a reduced-form analysis of the reform. This analysis shows that the rise in the price of retirement created by the reform had a positive but relatively small effect on the fraction of people retiring later, suggesting that the deadweight losses associated with the behavioral reactions to pension program parameters are relatively small.
520 $a In the second chapter of this dissertation, I expand the analysis begun in Chapter 1, using a large administrative micro dataset of a sub-sample of California teacher retirements. I first estimate a nonstochastic structural model of retirement timing, the results of which mirror the reduced-form estimates of the previous chapter. I also explore the relationship between the reduced-form "peak value" estimation method that has permeated the retirement timing literature and structural estimation methods. I find that, in the context of the California teachers' pension reform, the predictions of the "peak value" model deviate from the structural predictions, and that the structural estimation better captures the composition of the observed response to the reform.
520 $a In the third chapter of this dissertation, I exploit an administrative change at a large, national 401(k) recordkeeper to test if 401(k) distribution behavior is consistent with present-biased preferences. The administrative change generated exogenous variation in the distribution delay without changing other features of the distribution decision faced by separated employees. With both a graphical and a reduced-form statistical analysis of a large administrative dataset, I find that the propensity to roll over and to cash out 401(k) balances increases. This behavior is not consistent with either time-consistent or present-biased preferences.
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