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Assessing CEO power: Compensation, t...

The University of Texas at Dallas.

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Assessing CEO power: Compensation, turnover, and shareholder activism.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Assessing CEO power: Compensation, turnover, and shareholder activism./
作者:	Hasenhuttl, Maria Anna.
面頁冊數:	147 p.
附註:	Adviser: J. Richard Harrison.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-12A.
標題:	Business Administration, Management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3340477
ISBN:	9780549951261

Assessing CEO power: Compensation, turnover, and shareholder activism.
Hasenhuttl, Maria Anna.

Assessing CEO power: Compensation, turnover, and shareholder activism. - 147 p.

Adviser: J. Richard Harrison.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Dallas, 2008.

In my dissertation I look at the impact of CEOs in three areas. In chapter one I examine the relationship between CEO compensation and CEO turnover during the mid-90s. Corporate proxy statements contain various justifications used to explain the compensation scheme of a particular company. One justification frequently used is that higher CEO compensation reduces exit and increases loyalty. The goal of chapter one was to examine the empirical validity of this justification and the social comparison and equity perspectives associated with it. I find that relative CEO compensation has limited effects on CEO turnover, but that CEO power reduces turnover for poorly performing CEOs, supporting the perspective that strong CEOs control their boards. In chapter two I look at the impact of shareholder activism on corporate charter and by-law provisions. Shareholder activism, in particular, the active role of institutional investors, has been widely heralded as the latest solution to the agency problem of constraining managerial discretion in large American corporations. I find that after the initial wave of shareholder activism in the late 1980s, management learned to manage these new shareholder pressures and regained their traditional support from institutional investors. This resulted in the subsequent reversal of "shareholder-friendly" corporate charters and bylaws changes made during the shareholder rights movement. I conclude that neo-managerial theory, which emphasizes the power of corporate management to control corporate affairs within manageable constraints, remains a valid perspective on corporate control in the United States. Chapter three provides a first investigation of determinants of turnover in the compensation committee. Applying equity theory and a managerial power perspective, I hypothesize that underpaid CEOs will try to indirectly influence their compensation by changing the composition of the compensation committee. The limited findings were contrary to predictions. Various explanations are discussed. Overall, the dissertation findings elucidate conditions under which CEO interests dominate those of shareholders.

ISBN: 9780549951261Subjects--Topical Terms:

626628
Business Administration, Management.

Assessing CEO power: Compensation, turnover, and shareholder activism.
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520 $a In my dissertation I look at the impact of CEOs in three areas. In chapter one I examine the relationship between CEO compensation and CEO turnover during the mid-90s. Corporate proxy statements contain various justifications used to explain the compensation scheme of a particular company. One justification frequently used is that higher CEO compensation reduces exit and increases loyalty. The goal of chapter one was to examine the empirical validity of this justification and the social comparison and equity perspectives associated with it. I find that relative CEO compensation has limited effects on CEO turnover, but that CEO power reduces turnover for poorly performing CEOs, supporting the perspective that strong CEOs control their boards. In chapter two I look at the impact of shareholder activism on corporate charter and by-law provisions. Shareholder activism, in particular, the active role of institutional investors, has been widely heralded as the latest solution to the agency problem of constraining managerial discretion in large American corporations. I find that after the initial wave of shareholder activism in the late 1980s, management learned to manage these new shareholder pressures and regained their traditional support from institutional investors. This resulted in the subsequent reversal of "shareholder-friendly" corporate charters and bylaws changes made during the shareholder rights movement. I conclude that neo-managerial theory, which emphasizes the power of corporate management to control corporate affairs within manageable constraints, remains a valid perspective on corporate control in the United States. Chapter three provides a first investigation of determinants of turnover in the compensation committee. Applying equity theory and a managerial power perspective, I hypothesize that underpaid CEOs will try to indirectly influence their compensation by changing the composition of the compensation committee. The limited findings were contrary to predictions. Various explanations are discussed. Overall, the dissertation findings elucidate conditions under which CEO interests dominate those of shareholders.
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