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Does shareholder-sponsored corporate...

The University of Texas at Arlington., Accounting.

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Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation./
作者:	Wang, Xu.
面頁冊數:	152 p.
附註:	Adviser: Chandra Subramaniam.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-07A.
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3320160
ISBN:	9780549714811

Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
Wang, Xu.

Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation. - 152 p.

Adviser: Chandra Subramaniam.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.

This study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms.

ISBN: 9780549714811Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
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245 1 0 $a Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.
520 $a This study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms.
520 $a I find that firms are more likely to receive performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals when the firms have higher agency costs, stronger shareholder rights, or higher unexpected executive compensation. Shareholder executive-pay proposals gain more voting support from shareholders if the proposals are performance-oriented (than non-performance-oriented), sponsored by pension or union funds (than individual or religious groups and other institutions). In one year subsequent to the year of receiving performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals, proposal firms' executive pay-performance sensitivities in stock option grants, and cash and total compensation increase more than control firms'. In addition, CEOs' compensation structures shift more toward equity-based for the proposal firms than for control firms in the year subsequent to the proposal year.
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790 1 0 $a Hall, Thomas W. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Ho, Li-Chen Jennifer $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Sarkar, Salil K. $e committee member
790 1 0 $a Subramaniam, Chandra, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
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