東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Institutional impedance: Why the pos...

Georgetown University., Security Studies.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war./
作者:	Iams, Joel M.
面頁冊數:	59 p.
附註:	Adviser: Scott W. Harold.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International47-05.
標題:	History, Military. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1462585
ISBN:	9781109086393

Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war.
Iams, Joel M.

Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war. - 59 p.

Adviser: Scott W. Harold.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2009.

Before the Second World War, the United States successfully prosecuted a number of counterinsurgency campaigns, defeating irregular adversaries in the Philippines and throughout the Caribbean. Since, the United States has not defeated a single irregular adversary despite numerous campaigns against such enemies. This paper hypothesizes that the institutional United States military's failure to fight effectively in irregular environments stems from its difficulty in constructing a flexible theory of victory and its preference for ignoring the integration of non-military factors in campaign planning. While this explains the observed phenomenon, the change after World War Two appears to correlate to an increase in the political influence of the institutional US military that promotes its inflexibility and focuses its campaign planning on overwhelmingly military mechanisms. Though the ongoing operation in Iraq offers an example of adaptation, the need to circumvent the institutional decision-making process in order to change the campaign plan actually reinforces the notion that the US military as an institution has extreme difficulty adjusting to the irregular environment due to its inflexible theory of victory and difficulty incorporating non-military endeavors into operational plans.

ISBN: 9781109086393Subjects--Topical Terms:

1019083
History, Military.

Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war.
LDR:02188nam 2200289 a 45 001 855807
005 20100708
008 100708s2009 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781109086393
035 $a (UMI)AAI1462585
035 $a AAI1462585
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Iams, Joel M. $3 1022495
245 1 0 $a Institutional impedance: Why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war.
300 $a 59 p.
500 $a Adviser: Scott W. Harold.
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 47-05, page: 2604.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2009.
520 $a Before the Second World War, the United States successfully prosecuted a number of counterinsurgency campaigns, defeating irregular adversaries in the Philippines and throughout the Caribbean. Since, the United States has not defeated a single irregular adversary despite numerous campaigns against such enemies. This paper hypothesizes that the institutional United States military's failure to fight effectively in irregular environments stems from its difficulty in constructing a flexible theory of victory and its preference for ignoring the integration of non-military factors in campaign planning. While this explains the observed phenomenon, the change after World War Two appears to correlate to an increase in the political influence of the institutional US military that promotes its inflexibility and focuses its campaign planning on overwhelmingly military mechanisms. Though the ongoing operation in Iraq offers an example of adaptation, the need to circumvent the institutional decision-making process in order to change the campaign plan actually reinforces the notion that the US military as an institution has extreme difficulty adjusting to the irregular environment due to its inflexible theory of victory and difficulty incorporating non-military endeavors into operational plans.
590 $a School code: 0076.
650 4 $a History, Military. $3 1019083
650 4 $a History, United States. $3 1017393
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0337
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0722
710 2 $a Georgetown University. $b Security Studies. $3 1020357
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 47-05.
790 $a 0076
790 1 0 $a Harold, Scott W., $e advisor
791 $a M.A.
792 $a 2009
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1462585