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What Can We See? About the Role of P...

Alvarado Quinteros, Erik Jefferson.

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What Can We See? About the Role of Phenomenology in Determining the Contents of Visual Perception.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	What Can We See? About the Role of Phenomenology in Determining the Contents of Visual Perception./
Author:	Alvarado Quinteros, Erik Jefferson.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
Description:	49 p.
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International86-01.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31238515
ISBN:	9798383215050

What Can We See? About the Role of Phenomenology in Determining the Contents of Visual Perception.
Alvarado Quinteros, Erik Jefferson.

What Can We See? About the Role of Phenomenology in Determining the Contents of Visual Perception. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 49 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01.

Thesis (M.A.)--Oklahoma State University, 2024.

There is an ongoing debate between Conservatism (Brogaard, 2013; Dretske, 2015; Price, 2009; Prinz, 2013) and Liberalism (Bayne, 2016; Siegel, 2007, 2010; Krueger, 2018; and Zahavi, 2011) regarding the content of visual perception. Conservatism posits that our visual perception represents only low-level features such as color, shape, spatial location, and motion. In contrast, Liberalism argues that we can perceive high-level features such as natural kinds, mental states, and event-causal properties, among others. While Conservatism supports its arguments using Twin-Earth scenarios, Liberalism appeals to phenomenal contrast arguments. This paper aims to make progress in this debate by identifying the methodological assumptions of both Conservatism and Liberalism. Biconditional Intentionalism is required to support Conservatism, while Minimal Intentionalism is required to support Liberalism. Biconditional Intentionalism claims that any difference in the experience's phenomenal character comes with a difference in its representational content and vice versa. In contrast, Minimal Intentionalism claims that if two experiences differ in their phenomenal character, then they differ in representational content. So, it leaves open the possibility that two experiences with different representational content may have the same phenomenology. In this work, I argue that it is not possible to determine which view is correct by relying solely on phenomenology. To address this issue, we need to ask two different questions: (I) "What can we visually perceive?" and (II) "How do we identify the content of visual perception?" By answering these questions, we can expand our comprehension of the debate beyond phenomenological considerations. I suggest that insights from vision science can be a helpful way to overcome the debate between Conservatism and Liberalism regarding the contents of visual perception, as there are internal reasons to consider Minimal and Biconditional Intentionalism to be wrong. This approach has significant implications as it forces us to move beyond the phenomenological considerations that are part of the debate between Conservatism and Liberalism. By relying on vision science, we could gain a different perspective that can help us determine the contents of perception.

ISBN: 9798383215050Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Conservatism

What Can We See? About the Role of Phenomenology in Determining the Contents of Visual Perception.
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520 $a There is an ongoing debate between Conservatism (Brogaard, 2013; Dretske, 2015; Price, 2009; Prinz, 2013) and Liberalism (Bayne, 2016; Siegel, 2007, 2010; Krueger, 2018; and Zahavi, 2011) regarding the content of visual perception. Conservatism posits that our visual perception represents only low-level features such as color, shape, spatial location, and motion. In contrast, Liberalism argues that we can perceive high-level features such as natural kinds, mental states, and event-causal properties, among others. While Conservatism supports its arguments using Twin-Earth scenarios, Liberalism appeals to phenomenal contrast arguments. This paper aims to make progress in this debate by identifying the methodological assumptions of both Conservatism and Liberalism. Biconditional Intentionalism is required to support Conservatism, while Minimal Intentionalism is required to support Liberalism. Biconditional Intentionalism claims that any difference in the experience's phenomenal character comes with a difference in its representational content and vice versa. In contrast, Minimal Intentionalism claims that if two experiences differ in their phenomenal character, then they differ in representational content. So, it leaves open the possibility that two experiences with different representational content may have the same phenomenology. In this work, I argue that it is not possible to determine which view is correct by relying solely on phenomenology. To address this issue, we need to ask two different questions: (I) "What can we visually perceive?" and (II) "How do we identify the content of visual perception?" By answering these questions, we can expand our comprehension of the debate beyond phenomenological considerations. I suggest that insights from vision science can be a helpful way to overcome the debate between Conservatism and Liberalism regarding the contents of visual perception, as there are internal reasons to consider Minimal and Biconditional Intentionalism to be wrong. This approach has significant implications as it forces us to move beyond the phenomenological considerations that are part of the debate between Conservatism and Liberalism. By relying on vision science, we could gain a different perspective that can help us determine the contents of perception.
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