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Management ownership and project cho...

Ezrielev, Jay.

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Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence./
Author:	Ezrielev, Jay.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2001,
Description:	144 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International63-02A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3009305
ISBN:	9780493187884

Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence.
Ezrielev, Jay.

Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2001 - 144 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2001.

The dissertation examines managerial incentives to invest in risky in projects. It is composed of three chapters. The first chapter formulates a model of project choice and performs an empirical investigation of the effects of management ownership on the selection of risky projects. The results suggest that the holdings of options by the top manager in a firm are associated with greater risk-taking and greater profit growth. No relationship is found between managerial share holdings and risky decisions or profit growth. The findings also indicate that the extent to which the top manager of a firm is secure in his job is positively related to the selection of risky projects as well as to the growth of profits. The second chapter examines the recent rise in options compensation. This trend in compensation coincides with the exceptionally high stock market returns. The proposed theory of managerial compensation and risky project choice explains both facts. It is shown that there may be multiple project investment equilibria. In one equilibrium managers will receive few stock options and will refrain from investing in risky projects, while under other equilibria managers will receive greater stock option compensation and will invest in risky projects more frequently. It was shown in the first chapter of the dissertation that risky projects tend to be more profitable. Therefore, the rise in both the stock market and the options compensation may be due to a transition from a low-risk investment equilibrium to a high-risk equilibrium. The third chapter investigates the role of venture capital in financing new businesses. In the proposed model managers of large firms avoid investing in risky projects because of the adverse career consequences of project failure. Venture capital firms aim to maximize the average return on investment and are thus willing to invest in risky projects. The theory suggests that large firms invest in large but safe projects, and venture capitalists invest in small but risky projects. This is what is actually observed.

ISBN: 9780493187884Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Agency

Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence.
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100 1 $a Ezrielev, Jay. $3 3770666
245 1 0 $a Management ownership and project choice: Theory and evidence.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2001
300 $a 144 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Frydman, Roman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2001.
520 $a The dissertation examines managerial incentives to invest in risky in projects. It is composed of three chapters. The first chapter formulates a model of project choice and performs an empirical investigation of the effects of management ownership on the selection of risky projects. The results suggest that the holdings of options by the top manager in a firm are associated with greater risk-taking and greater profit growth. No relationship is found between managerial share holdings and risky decisions or profit growth. The findings also indicate that the extent to which the top manager of a firm is secure in his job is positively related to the selection of risky projects as well as to the growth of profits. The second chapter examines the recent rise in options compensation. This trend in compensation coincides with the exceptionally high stock market returns. The proposed theory of managerial compensation and risky project choice explains both facts. It is shown that there may be multiple project investment equilibria. In one equilibrium managers will receive few stock options and will refrain from investing in risky projects, while under other equilibria managers will receive greater stock option compensation and will invest in risky projects more frequently. It was shown in the first chapter of the dissertation that risky projects tend to be more profitable. Therefore, the rise in both the stock market and the options compensation may be due to a transition from a low-risk investment equilibrium to a high-risk equilibrium. The third chapter investigates the role of venture capital in financing new businesses. In the proposed model managers of large firms avoid investing in risky projects because of the adverse career consequences of project failure. Venture capital firms aim to maximize the average return on investment and are thus willing to invest in risky projects. The theory suggests that large firms invest in large but safe projects, and venture capitalists invest in small but risky projects. This is what is actually observed.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Investments. $3 566987
650 4 $a Studies. $3 3433795
653 $a Agency
653 $a Corporate governance
653 $a Executive compensation
653 $a Management
653 $a Ownership
653 $a Project choice
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0505
710 2 $a New York University. $3 515735
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 63-02A.
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3009305