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Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulnes...

Trubowitz, Joshua Boone.

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Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle's Theory of Perception.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle's Theory of Perception./
作者:	Trubowitz, Joshua Boone.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	175 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-02A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30572808
ISBN:	9798380141734

Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle's Theory of Perception.
Trubowitz, Joshua Boone.

Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle's Theory of Perception. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 175 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2023.

According to Aristotle, perception is a form of truthful cognition or knowledge. Many scholars think that he considers perception to be fundamentally passive in character, and conclude that perceptual knowledge, for Aristotle, is either a form of knowledge by acquaintance, or else a mere veridical awareness. My dissertation argues that on the contrary, Aristotle rejects such views on the grounds that things can be known for what they are (e.g., hard) only insofar as they are actively distinguished from what they are not (e.g., soft). Perception amounts to a form or truthful cognition or knowledge only insofar as it involves this spontaneous, 'critical' (kritikon) activity-literally, a separative act. This means that perceptual knowledge, for Aristotle, is essentially identificatory-cum-discriminative. Perception can be so 'active' because the Aristotelian soul (its perceptual 'part') is not a capacity for passive, phenomenal awareness, but is rather an 'unmoved mover,' or the principle of a perceiver's spontaneous activity.The Introduction, an account of the activities 'common' to soul and body, makes room for the idea that the soul acts in perception as an 'unmoved mover.' Chapter 1 explains Aristotle's 'form without matter' doctrine, or his account of passive perceptual receptivity. Chapter 2, on his account of our ability to 'perceive that we perceive,' shows that perceptual consciousness, for Aristotle, is none other than a perceiver's spontaneous, 'critical' activity. Chapter 3 is an account of the 'perceptual mean' and the nature of the 'critical' act in perception. Chapter 4, on Aristotle's doctrine of perceptual infallibility, explains his confidence that this 'critical' act is authoritative and unerring. The Conclusion considers his break with Plato over perception's status as a genuine 'critical power.' As a whole, the dissertation shows that the driving aim of Aristotle's theory of perception is to defend the knowability of the sensible world in its entirety.

ISBN: 9798380141734Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Aristotle

Spontaneous Activity and Truthfulness in Aristotle's Theory of Perception.
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