東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

The politics of institutional design...

Zhao, Suisheng.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937./
Author:	Zhao, Suisheng.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1992,
Description:	350 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International54-03A.
Subject:	Public administration. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9227858
ISBN:	9798208340639

The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937.
Zhao, Suisheng.

The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1992 - 350 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1992.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

A study of seven versions of the Organic Law and several drafts of the constitution indicates that the presidential and cabinet systems existed alternatively during the formative period (1925-1937) of the Chinese Nationalist government. A cabinet system was designed in 1925. A presidential system replaced the cabinet system in 1928. The cabinet system was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was finally installed in 1936. The alternation of the two systems is explained as an outcome of the power contest among individual political actors. It is found that, in the authoritarian setting of Nationalist China, the presidential system facilitated what Aristotle called "rule by one" whereas the cabinet system accommodated Aristotle's "rule by the few." Chiang Kai-shek, as the single political actor who anticipated becoming dominant in Nationalist China, preferred the presidential system whereas Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, and Sun Ke, each was in a weaker position, sought a share of power by promoting the collective leadership of cabinet system. When a balance of power among the four actors existed in 1925 the cabinet system prevailed. The presidential system was adopted in 1928 when China Kai-shek defeated his rivals. The cabinet system restored in 1931 when a grand anti-Chiang coalition, consisting of Wang, Hu, and Sun, as well as several powerful regional militarists, restored the balance of power. The final establishment of the presidential system in 1936 was an outcome of Chiang's ultimate victory over his rivals. By exploring the political dynamics of institutional design in Nationalist China, this study argues that institutional design was a choice among competing preferences and an outcome of the struggle for the positions of power from which such a choice could be made. It also offers a theoretical perspective that will enable the Chinese case to be systematically compared with other cases.

ISBN: 9798208340639Subjects--Topical Terms:

531287
Public administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

presidential government

The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937.
LDR:03235nmm a2200373 4500 001 2394259
005 20240416125359.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s1992 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798208340639
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI9227858
035 $a AAI9227858
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhao, Suisheng. $3 591830
245 1 0 $a The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-1937.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 1992
300 $a 350 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Shirk, Susan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1992.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a A study of seven versions of the Organic Law and several drafts of the constitution indicates that the presidential and cabinet systems existed alternatively during the formative period (1925-1937) of the Chinese Nationalist government. A cabinet system was designed in 1925. A presidential system replaced the cabinet system in 1928. The cabinet system was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was finally installed in 1936. The alternation of the two systems is explained as an outcome of the power contest among individual political actors. It is found that, in the authoritarian setting of Nationalist China, the presidential system facilitated what Aristotle called "rule by one" whereas the cabinet system accommodated Aristotle's "rule by the few." Chiang Kai-shek, as the single political actor who anticipated becoming dominant in Nationalist China, preferred the presidential system whereas Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, and Sun Ke, each was in a weaker position, sought a share of power by promoting the collective leadership of cabinet system. When a balance of power among the four actors existed in 1925 the cabinet system prevailed. The presidential system was adopted in 1928 when China Kai-shek defeated his rivals. The cabinet system restored in 1931 when a grand anti-Chiang coalition, consisting of Wang, Hu, and Sun, as well as several powerful regional militarists, restored the balance of power. The final establishment of the presidential system in 1936 was an outcome of Chiang's ultimate victory over his rivals. By exploring the political dynamics of institutional design in Nationalist China, this study argues that institutional design was a choice among competing preferences and an outcome of the struggle for the positions of power from which such a choice could be made. It also offers a theoretical perspective that will enable the Chinese case to be systematically compared with other cases.
590 $a School code: 0033.
650 4 $a Public administration. $3 531287
650 4 $a History. $3 516518
650 4 $a Asian history. $2 bicssc $3 1099323
653 $a presidential government
690 $a 0617
690 $a 0332
690 $a 0578
710 2 $a University of California, San Diego. $3 1018093
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 54-03A.
790 $a 0033
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1992
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9227858