東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Spinoza, Explained.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Spinoza, Explained./
Author:	Harrop, Stephen Dominic.
Description:	1 online resource (239 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-09A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29207804click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798371908810

Spinoza, Explained.
Harrop, Stephen Dominic.

Spinoza, Explained. - 1 online resource (239 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

Spinoza believes that everything has an explanation. He also is committed to the ideal of a unified science, which joins natural and speculative philosophy. That said, no thorough account of Spinozistic explanation exists. In the first part of my dissertation, I formulate such an account. I argue that for Spinoza, a scientific explanation is a causal narrative which links explanans and explanandum according to laws of nature, involves their essences, and situates the explanandum against some contrast class.There is a major controversy in Spinoza scholarship over whether Spinoza endorses teleological explanations, with some (such as Don Garrett, Martin Lin, and Paul Hoffman) arguing that he does, and others (such as John Carriero and Jonathan Bennett) arguing that he does not. In the second part of my dissertation I give a novel argument that Spinoza does not think teleological explanations feature in a mature science. I argue that two important current readings, on which Spinoza does use teleological explanations, are in conflict with two of Spinoza's distinctive views - the conatus doctrine, according to which each individual thing strives to remain in existence, and Spinoza's views on action, according to which we are active exactly when our actions follow from our essence alone. I conclude by arguing that, for Spinoza, to the extent that we view ourselves as end-governed beings, we are less able to achieve the highest form of human happiness, blessedness. In the third part of my dissertation, I engage two questions which arise from the analysis given in the first part. First, how, for Spinoza, do we come to know the essences of the explanans(tia) and explanandum(a)? I argue that he rejects the notion that essences are discoverable by experiment. I produce this account by a new reading of the Spinoza-Oldenburg-Boyle correspondence (which is, with some exceptions, not dealt with in detail by the extant literature), and argue that Spinoza's epistemological views, and his views on the aim of science, militate against a science based on experiments.Second, is the use of mathematical concepts in such explanations licit? Some recent scholarship (most notably represented by Alison Peterman and Eric Schliesser) argues that, for Spinoza, the use of mathematical concepts in the study of nature produces inadequate cognition. I argue that, while ordinary mathematical concepts may be inadequate, there is room in Spinoza's system for another kind of mathematical concept whose adequacy depends on having an entirely different causal history from the inadequate ones.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798371908810Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Spinoza's philosophyIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Spinoza, Explained.
LDR:03855nmm a2200373K 4500 001 2364197
005 20231130104152.5
006 m o d
007 cr mn ---uuuuu
008 241011s2022 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9798371908810
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI29207804
035 $a AAI29207804
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Harrop, Stephen Dominic. $3 3705000
245 1 0 $a Spinoza, Explained.
264 0 $c 2022
300 $a 1 online resource (239 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Della Rocca, Michael.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2022.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Spinoza believes that everything has an explanation. He also is committed to the ideal of a unified science, which joins natural and speculative philosophy. That said, no thorough account of Spinozistic explanation exists. In the first part of my dissertation, I formulate such an account. I argue that for Spinoza, a scientific explanation is a causal narrative which links explanans and explanandum according to laws of nature, involves their essences, and situates the explanandum against some contrast class.There is a major controversy in Spinoza scholarship over whether Spinoza endorses teleological explanations, with some (such as Don Garrett, Martin Lin, and Paul Hoffman) arguing that he does, and others (such as John Carriero and Jonathan Bennett) arguing that he does not. In the second part of my dissertation I give a novel argument that Spinoza does not think teleological explanations feature in a mature science. I argue that two important current readings, on which Spinoza does use teleological explanations, are in conflict with two of Spinoza's distinctive views - the conatus doctrine, according to which each individual thing strives to remain in existence, and Spinoza's views on action, according to which we are active exactly when our actions follow from our essence alone. I conclude by arguing that, for Spinoza, to the extent that we view ourselves as end-governed beings, we are less able to achieve the highest form of human happiness, blessedness. In the third part of my dissertation, I engage two questions which arise from the analysis given in the first part. First, how, for Spinoza, do we come to know the essences of the explanans(tia) and explanandum(a)? I argue that he rejects the notion that essences are discoverable by experiment. I produce this account by a new reading of the Spinoza-Oldenburg-Boyle correspondence (which is, with some exceptions, not dealt with in detail by the extant literature), and argue that Spinoza's epistemological views, and his views on the aim of science, militate against a science based on experiments.Second, is the use of mathematical concepts in such explanations licit? Some recent scholarship (most notably represented by Alison Peterman and Eric Schliesser) argues that, for Spinoza, the use of mathematical concepts in the study of nature produces inadequate cognition. I argue that, while ordinary mathematical concepts may be inadequate, there is room in Spinoza's system for another kind of mathematical concept whose adequacy depends on having an entirely different causal history from the inadequate ones.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
650 4 $a Philosophy of science. $2 bicssc $3 2079849
653 $a Spinoza's philosophy
653 $a Explanatory rationalism
653 $a Metaphysics
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0402
690 $a 0396
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 783688
710 2 $a Yale University. $b Philosophy. $3 2100866
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-09A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29207804 $z click for full text (PQDT)