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Essays on Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Diplomacy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Diplomacy./
作者:	Goldfien, Michael A.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (233 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-01A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30311921click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379781163

Essays on Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Diplomacy.
Goldfien, Michael A.

Essays on Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Diplomacy. - 1 online resource (233 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation explores leadership and the politics of diplomacy at the international and domestic levels. How do leaders shape and intervene in their domestic environments to gain diplomatic advantages on the international stage? And how does political accountability constrain leaders on matters of cooperation? The dissertation includes three chapters that address these questions. The first chapter argues that regime type determines whether hawkish or dovish leaders are more likely to achieve a rapprochement with international rivals. Using game theory and quantitative and qualitative empirics, it shows that doves are more likely to achieve a rapprochement when they lead autocracies rather than democracies. The second chapter explains that patronage is only one reason that U.S. presidents and other leaders use relative novices for high-ranking diplomatic posts. Using game theory and a novel dataset on U.S. ambassadorial appointments, the chapter shows that political appointees' familiarity with the president offers distinct diplomatic advantages, especially for high-importance assignments. The last chapter is co-authored and explores the link between leaders' domestic actions and international reputations for resolve. Using formal theory and conjoint experiments, it shows that standing firm in domestic disputes can have a large impact on perceptions of a leaders' willingness to use force abroad. Domestic actions that are highly salient and similar in costs to military conflict can produce reputational effects on par with past in international crisis behavior.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379781163Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

PoliticsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Essays on Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Diplomacy.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation explores leadership and the politics of diplomacy at the international and domestic levels. How do leaders shape and intervene in their domestic environments to gain diplomatic advantages on the international stage? And how does political accountability constrain leaders on matters of cooperation? The dissertation includes three chapters that address these questions. The first chapter argues that regime type determines whether hawkish or dovish leaders are more likely to achieve a rapprochement with international rivals. Using game theory and quantitative and qualitative empirics, it shows that doves are more likely to achieve a rapprochement when they lead autocracies rather than democracies. The second chapter explains that patronage is only one reason that U.S. presidents and other leaders use relative novices for high-ranking diplomatic posts. Using game theory and a novel dataset on U.S. ambassadorial appointments, the chapter shows that political appointees' familiarity with the president offers distinct diplomatic advantages, especially for high-importance assignments. The last chapter is co-authored and explores the link between leaders' domestic actions and international reputations for resolve. Using formal theory and conjoint experiments, it shows that standing firm in domestic disputes can have a large impact on perceptions of a leaders' willingness to use force abroad. Domestic actions that are highly salient and similar in costs to military conflict can produce reputational effects on par with past in international crisis behavior.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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653 $a Diplomacy
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653 $a Domestic disputes
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