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Robust Solutions for Enabling Trust in Digital Circuits.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Robust Solutions for Enabling Trust in Digital Circuits./
作者:	Zhang, Yuqiao.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (105 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-04, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-04B.
標題:	Piracy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29408770click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798352650967

Robust Solutions for Enabling Trust in Digital Circuits.
Zhang, Yuqiao.

Robust Solutions for Enabling Trust in Digital Circuits. - 1 online resource (105 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-04, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Auburn University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

The continuous emergence of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) in the electronics supply chain requires immediate solutions since they pose serious threats to our critical infrastructures due to their inferior quality. Information Handling Services Inc. reported that counterfeit ICs represent a potential annual risk of $169 billion to the global electronics supply chain and have continued to increase in recent years. These counterfeit ICs can be categorized into seven distinct types: recycled, remarked, defective/out-of-spec, overproduced, cloned, forged documentation, and tampered. It is reported that recycled ICs account for almost 80% of all reported counterfeit incidents. The rise of these recycled ICs in critical infrastructures can cause major concerns to the government and industry because these chips exhibit lower performance and have a shorter remaining lifespan. In addition, high temperatures, followed by sanding, repackaging, and remarking in the crude recycling process could potentially create extra defects in the ICs. The illegal recycling process may also create latent defects that can pass initial acceptance testing by original equipment manufacturers (OEM) but are susceptible to failure in the field. Furthermore, the detection of these ICs becomes extremely challenging when they are already circulating in the supply chain. Generally, it is necessary to power up a chip at a distributor's site to measure different electrical parameters to verify whether it was pre-owned or not. However, this can be challenging as many distributors may not be equipped with proper test infrastructures. Moreover, the reliability of authentic chips may be reduced if they were removed from their packaging boxes for testing purposes.In parallel, due to the globalization in the semiconductor industry, the cost of maintaining a foundry is enormous. Hence, most integrated circuit IC design houses have become fabless. However, the security issue of intellectual property (IP) becomes another concern. Typically, a design house acquires multiple third-party cores for a system on a chip (SoC) and sends a contract to a foundry/fab for manufacturing and test. The horizontal integration of semiconductor design, manufacturing, and test causes a significant increase in potential harmful threats. The most notable ones are overproduction or counterfeiting of ICs, piracy of IP, and insertion of hardware Trojans (HT) . To address these threats, researchers have proposed solutions that include hardware metering, logic locking, IP watermarking, and split manufacturing. Logic locking is the most widely accepted and design-for-trust (DFT) technique to prevent those threats from untrusted manufacturing. It hides the circuit's inner details by incorporating key gates in the original circuit resulting in a key-dependent locked counterpart. The resultant locked circuit functions correctly once the secret key is programmed into its tamper-proof memory. The inserted logic can be commonly categorized based on key-insertion strategy and can be described as: (i) XOR/XNOR-based, (ii) MUX-based, (iii) Look-up Table (LUT)-based, and (iv) state-space based. However, existing logic locking techniques can be rendered ineffective using the state-of-art methods that include Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attacks, probing, and tampering attacks. One can obtain the secret key from a functional chip and then unlock any number of locked ICs as the key value remains the same for every chip.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798352650967Subjects--Topical Terms:

2002701
Piracy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Robust Solutions for Enabling Trust in Digital Circuits.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The continuous emergence of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) in the electronics supply chain requires immediate solutions since they pose serious threats to our critical infrastructures due to their inferior quality. Information Handling Services Inc. reported that counterfeit ICs represent a potential annual risk of $169 billion to the global electronics supply chain and have continued to increase in recent years. These counterfeit ICs can be categorized into seven distinct types: recycled, remarked, defective/out-of-spec, overproduced, cloned, forged documentation, and tampered. It is reported that recycled ICs account for almost 80% of all reported counterfeit incidents. The rise of these recycled ICs in critical infrastructures can cause major concerns to the government and industry because these chips exhibit lower performance and have a shorter remaining lifespan. In addition, high temperatures, followed by sanding, repackaging, and remarking in the crude recycling process could potentially create extra defects in the ICs. The illegal recycling process may also create latent defects that can pass initial acceptance testing by original equipment manufacturers (OEM) but are susceptible to failure in the field. Furthermore, the detection of these ICs becomes extremely challenging when they are already circulating in the supply chain. Generally, it is necessary to power up a chip at a distributor's site to measure different electrical parameters to verify whether it was pre-owned or not. However, this can be challenging as many distributors may not be equipped with proper test infrastructures. Moreover, the reliability of authentic chips may be reduced if they were removed from their packaging boxes for testing purposes.In parallel, due to the globalization in the semiconductor industry, the cost of maintaining a foundry is enormous. Hence, most integrated circuit IC design houses have become fabless. However, the security issue of intellectual property (IP) becomes another concern. Typically, a design house acquires multiple third-party cores for a system on a chip (SoC) and sends a contract to a foundry/fab for manufacturing and test. The horizontal integration of semiconductor design, manufacturing, and test causes a significant increase in potential harmful threats. The most notable ones are overproduction or counterfeiting of ICs, piracy of IP, and insertion of hardware Trojans (HT) . To address these threats, researchers have proposed solutions that include hardware metering, logic locking, IP watermarking, and split manufacturing. Logic locking is the most widely accepted and design-for-trust (DFT) technique to prevent those threats from untrusted manufacturing. It hides the circuit's inner details by incorporating key gates in the original circuit resulting in a key-dependent locked counterpart. The resultant locked circuit functions correctly once the secret key is programmed into its tamper-proof memory. The inserted logic can be commonly categorized based on key-insertion strategy and can be described as: (i) XOR/XNOR-based, (ii) MUX-based, (iii) Look-up Table (LUT)-based, and (iv) state-space based. However, existing logic locking techniques can be rendered ineffective using the state-of-art methods that include Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attacks, probing, and tampering attacks. One can obtain the secret key from a functional chip and then unlock any number of locked ICs as the key value remains the same for every chip.
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