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The illusion of consensus : = American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The illusion of consensus :/
其他題名:	American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958.
作者:	McGlade, Jacqueline Ann.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (626 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 56-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International56-12A.
標題:	American history. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9522071click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798208959497

The illusion of consensus : = American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958.
McGlade, Jacqueline Ann.

The illusion of consensus :American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958. - 1 online resource (626 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 56-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 1995.

Includes bibliographical references

From 1948 to 1958, the United States extended approximately $30 billion in technical and industrial aid to Western Europe through the European Cooperation Administration and its successor agencies, the Foreign Operations Administration and the International Cooperation Administration. This study traces the political and administrative evolution of U.S. technical aid and its impact on the recovery efforts of European nations and industries after World War II. In particular, it examines how the Cold War forced the dramatic reorientation of European aid policy from liberalized economic recovery to NATO military production. While dozens of aid programs operated over the decade, one program, the United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (USTA\\&P), provides the most comprehensive portrayal of the complex, and often tortured, progression of U.S.-European aid administration and relations during the early Cold War. A close examination of the USTA&P reveals that a small but vocal group of American aid administrators and European leaders consistently resisted the total redirection of technical assistance away from economic reform towards anti-Soviet defense. As the former framers and supporters of the European Recovery Program, they held to the view that Cold War aims, such as the formation of an East-West trade split, belied the original postwar mission of the United States to advance greater global economic integration and redevelopment. In their opinion, the best defense against communism in Europe was U.S. support of increased industrial productivity, the spread of management and labor reform, and greater cultivation of mass consumer enterprises and overseas markets. In an attempt to maintain the illusion of U.S.-European consensus, the Eisenhower administration retained both European domestic and military assistance under the Mutual Security Administration upon taking office in 1953. By doing so, it perpetuated the incongruous and paradoxical arrangement of U.S. aid policy, which called for the simultaneous advance of Cold War containment alongside postwar global economic integration and trade liberalization. As an additional consequence, European nations received after 1953 an unprecedented, and unanticipated, amount of domestic industrial aid, enhanced by even greater exposure to U.S. business activities and methods through the USTA&P and the NATO offshore procurement program. It is argued here that such programs provided a crucial "blueprint" upon which Western Europe revived and rebuilt its infrastructure of industrial capitalism and trade after World War II.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798208959497Subjects--Topical Terms:

2122692
American history.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

The illusion of consensus : = American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958.
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245 1 4 $a The illusion of consensus : $b American business, Cold War aid and the industrial recovery of Western Europe, 1948-1958.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 56-12, Section: A.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 1995.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a From 1948 to 1958, the United States extended approximately $30 billion in technical and industrial aid to Western Europe through the European Cooperation Administration and its successor agencies, the Foreign Operations Administration and the International Cooperation Administration. This study traces the political and administrative evolution of U.S. technical aid and its impact on the recovery efforts of European nations and industries after World War II. In particular, it examines how the Cold War forced the dramatic reorientation of European aid policy from liberalized economic recovery to NATO military production. While dozens of aid programs operated over the decade, one program, the United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (USTA\\&P), provides the most comprehensive portrayal of the complex, and often tortured, progression of U.S.-European aid administration and relations during the early Cold War. A close examination of the USTA&P reveals that a small but vocal group of American aid administrators and European leaders consistently resisted the total redirection of technical assistance away from economic reform towards anti-Soviet defense. As the former framers and supporters of the European Recovery Program, they held to the view that Cold War aims, such as the formation of an East-West trade split, belied the original postwar mission of the United States to advance greater global economic integration and redevelopment. In their opinion, the best defense against communism in Europe was U.S. support of increased industrial productivity, the spread of management and labor reform, and greater cultivation of mass consumer enterprises and overseas markets. In an attempt to maintain the illusion of U.S.-European consensus, the Eisenhower administration retained both European domestic and military assistance under the Mutual Security Administration upon taking office in 1953. By doing so, it perpetuated the incongruous and paradoxical arrangement of U.S. aid policy, which called for the simultaneous advance of Cold War containment alongside postwar global economic integration and trade liberalization. As an additional consequence, European nations received after 1953 an unprecedented, and unanticipated, amount of domestic industrial aid, enhanced by even greater exposure to U.S. business activities and methods through the USTA&P and the NATO offshore procurement program. It is argued here that such programs provided a crucial "blueprint" upon which Western Europe revived and rebuilt its infrastructure of industrial capitalism and trade after World War II.
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650 4 $a European history. $2 bicssc $3 1972904
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773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 56-12A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9522071 $z click for full text (PQDT)