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Defense Spending and Alliance Reliability : = A Mixed-Methods Analysis.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Defense Spending and Alliance Reliability :/
Reminder of title:	A Mixed-Methods Analysis.
Author:	Conklin, Mark Emerson.
Description:	1 online resource (109 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-05A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30192763click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798352946718

Defense Spending and Alliance Reliability : = A Mixed-Methods Analysis.
Conklin, Mark Emerson.

Defense Spending and Alliance Reliability :A Mixed-Methods Analysis. - 1 online resource (109 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Vanderbilt University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation investigates the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability. I begin with a formal, game theoretic model in which a targeted member of a military alliance anticipates a challenge and makes an investment in military capability. The ally, in turn, observes the challenge and then decides whether to participate in conflict in the event of bargaining failure. I consider various scenarios of relative military capability and a flexible interpretation of the effectiveness of military investment. The model lends formal rigor to several open debates improving upon published conclusions regarding resource allocation, free-riding in international institutions, and the trade-off between arms and allies. Next, I report the results of empirical analysis of the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability. I consider the effects of military spending on both the durability of alliances in general as well as the effects of spending on wartime cooperation. This research expands upon existing scholarship by incorporating current data and methods and updates conclusions by considering the temporal scope of defense spending while relating its effects to ally behavior in both war and peace. Finally, I conclude with several case studies, lending descriptive analysis of individual events and facilitating a deeper understanding of the relationship between defense spending and alliance defection. Indeed, the theorized relationships are borne out by the historical record - defense spending has influenced the behavior of allies in predictable ways. The cases introduce additional factors into the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability that were not previously studied.The results of these collected works represent an important contribution to the study of alliances with several implications for alliance policy and behavior. First, states that encourage their allies to increase defense spending to meet an arbitrary threshold may do so at their own peril. As this study demonstrates, increased peacetime defense spending results in increased incidents of early alliance termination. However, if states anticipate conflict, then the negative effects of increased in defense spending may be mitigated, particularly if states acquire capabilities that fulfill alliance security needs. Therefore, states desiring to both increase spending among allies and preserve the reliability of their alliances do best to emphasize the imminent threat of conflict with joint adversaries. Smaller defense contributions may indeed be the best option for smaller alliance members, and states must consider the strategic calculus of their partners when judging their defense budgets. Exacerbating tensions by criticism or competition undermines alliance reliability, while reinforcing commitments to smaller states and allowing them to specialize their military forces can create battlefield efficiencies that yield the best results for all allies fighting together.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798352946718Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

AlliancesIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Defense Spending and Alliance Reliability : = A Mixed-Methods Analysis.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: A.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation investigates the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability. I begin with a formal, game theoretic model in which a targeted member of a military alliance anticipates a challenge and makes an investment in military capability. The ally, in turn, observes the challenge and then decides whether to participate in conflict in the event of bargaining failure. I consider various scenarios of relative military capability and a flexible interpretation of the effectiveness of military investment. The model lends formal rigor to several open debates improving upon published conclusions regarding resource allocation, free-riding in international institutions, and the trade-off between arms and allies. Next, I report the results of empirical analysis of the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability. I consider the effects of military spending on both the durability of alliances in general as well as the effects of spending on wartime cooperation. This research expands upon existing scholarship by incorporating current data and methods and updates conclusions by considering the temporal scope of defense spending while relating its effects to ally behavior in both war and peace. Finally, I conclude with several case studies, lending descriptive analysis of individual events and facilitating a deeper understanding of the relationship between defense spending and alliance defection. Indeed, the theorized relationships are borne out by the historical record - defense spending has influenced the behavior of allies in predictable ways. The cases introduce additional factors into the relationship between defense spending and alliance reliability that were not previously studied.The results of these collected works represent an important contribution to the study of alliances with several implications for alliance policy and behavior. First, states that encourage their allies to increase defense spending to meet an arbitrary threshold may do so at their own peril. As this study demonstrates, increased peacetime defense spending results in increased incidents of early alliance termination. However, if states anticipate conflict, then the negative effects of increased in defense spending may be mitigated, particularly if states acquire capabilities that fulfill alliance security needs. Therefore, states desiring to both increase spending among allies and preserve the reliability of their alliances do best to emphasize the imminent threat of conflict with joint adversaries. Smaller defense contributions may indeed be the best option for smaller alliance members, and states must consider the strategic calculus of their partners when judging their defense budgets. Exacerbating tensions by criticism or competition undermines alliance reliability, while reinforcing commitments to smaller states and allowing them to specialize their military forces can create battlefield efficiencies that yield the best results for all allies fighting together.
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650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
650 4 $a International law. $3 560784
653 $a Alliances
653 $a Defense spending
653 $a Defection
653 $a Abrogation
653 $a Military
653 $a Bargaining
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710 2 $a Vanderbilt University. $3 1017501
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-05A.
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