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Essays in the Regulation of Digital Markets.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in the Regulation of Digital Markets./
Author:	Lancieri, Filippo Maria.
Description:	1 online resource (205 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-04A.
Subject:	Law. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28549619click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798460458486

Essays in the Regulation of Digital Markets.
Lancieri, Filippo Maria.

Essays in the Regulation of Digital Markets. - 1 online resource (205 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-04, Section: A.

Thesis (J.S.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation addresses a number of issues in the regulation of digital markets by means of three different essays.The first essay studies the political economy of antitrust enforcement across the Atlantic. Many believe that the EU's enforcement actions against US companies are a form of digital protectionism. This essay looks at the foundations of data protection and antitrust policies to propose an alternative explanation. Europeans associate data protection with inalienable rights, Americans treat data as an asset. Europeans use competition policy to advance personal freedom, US antitrust policy focuses on economic efficiency. The combination of these singular EU traits encourages the regulation of internet companies. However, as the US does not share either trait, the EU/US divide over internet regulation will grow. The essay concludes by arguing for an adjusted role for economic reasoning in antitrust enforcement as an avenue to bridge differences.The second essay addresses the definition of antitrust relevant markets by discussing the American Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express. In a controversial landmark ruling, both the Court's majority and minority battled over definitions of relevant markets in the complex industry of electronic payments: the majority affirmed that "transaction platforms" always constitute a single "two-sided relevant market" and the minority argued that electronic payments are regular complementary goods subject to traditional "one-sided" analysis. This essay challenges both views and proposes a novel multi-layered approach. It then discusses the rich international experience of the EU and Brazil in the application of competition law to of electronic payments' markets as examples of cases where authorities sometimes correctly applied and sometimes fell short of this multi-layered view. Building on these insights, the essay develops a framework to define relevant markets in cases involving transaction platforms and concludes by outlining the applicability of this layered approach to a variety of markets commonly found in today's digital economy.The rise of data privacy laws is one of the most profound legal changes of this century. Yet, available data indicates that these laws recurrently suffer from an enforcement gap. This raises the question of the third essay: what accounts for this gap and what can be done to improve the performance of these laws? The essay first describes three core building blocks of data protection regimes in the United States and Europe-namely, market forces, tort liability and regulatory enforcement-that these jurisdictions combine to ensure that companies act in accordance consumers' privacy preferences. It then identifies two key reasons-particularly deep information asymmetries between companies and consumers/regulators, and high levels of market power in many data markets-that enable companies to behave strategically and undermine legal compliance. The conclusion looks at the institutional design of antitrust and anti-fraud laws to argue that an effective online privacy regulatory system should reflect three key principles. First, the system must multiply monitoring and enforcement resources; second, the system must bring violations to light; and third, the system must promote governmental accountability.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798460458486Subjects--Topical Terms:

600858
Law.
Subjects--Index Terms:

AntitrustIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Essays in the Regulation of Digital Markets.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-04, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Strahilevitz, Lior J. ; Picker, Randal.
502 $a Thesis (J.S.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation addresses a number of issues in the regulation of digital markets by means of three different essays.The first essay studies the political economy of antitrust enforcement across the Atlantic. Many believe that the EU's enforcement actions against US companies are a form of digital protectionism. This essay looks at the foundations of data protection and antitrust policies to propose an alternative explanation. Europeans associate data protection with inalienable rights, Americans treat data as an asset. Europeans use competition policy to advance personal freedom, US antitrust policy focuses on economic efficiency. The combination of these singular EU traits encourages the regulation of internet companies. However, as the US does not share either trait, the EU/US divide over internet regulation will grow. The essay concludes by arguing for an adjusted role for economic reasoning in antitrust enforcement as an avenue to bridge differences.The second essay addresses the definition of antitrust relevant markets by discussing the American Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express. In a controversial landmark ruling, both the Court's majority and minority battled over definitions of relevant markets in the complex industry of electronic payments: the majority affirmed that "transaction platforms" always constitute a single "two-sided relevant market" and the minority argued that electronic payments are regular complementary goods subject to traditional "one-sided" analysis. This essay challenges both views and proposes a novel multi-layered approach. It then discusses the rich international experience of the EU and Brazil in the application of competition law to of electronic payments' markets as examples of cases where authorities sometimes correctly applied and sometimes fell short of this multi-layered view. Building on these insights, the essay develops a framework to define relevant markets in cases involving transaction platforms and concludes by outlining the applicability of this layered approach to a variety of markets commonly found in today's digital economy.The rise of data privacy laws is one of the most profound legal changes of this century. Yet, available data indicates that these laws recurrently suffer from an enforcement gap. This raises the question of the third essay: what accounts for this gap and what can be done to improve the performance of these laws? The essay first describes three core building blocks of data protection regimes in the United States and Europe-namely, market forces, tort liability and regulatory enforcement-that these jurisdictions combine to ensure that companies act in accordance consumers' privacy preferences. It then identifies two key reasons-particularly deep information asymmetries between companies and consumers/regulators, and high levels of market power in many data markets-that enable companies to behave strategically and undermine legal compliance. The conclusion looks at the institutional design of antitrust and anti-fraud laws to argue that an effective online privacy regulatory system should reflect three key principles. First, the system must multiply monitoring and enforcement resources; second, the system must bring violations to light; and third, the system must promote governmental accountability.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Law. $3 600858
650 4 $a Law enforcement. $3 607408
650 4 $a International law. $3 560784
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
653 $a Antitrust
653 $a Data protection
653 $a Digital markets
653 $a Digital platforms
653 $a Enforcement
653 $a Regulation
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710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Law. $3 1673717
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-04A.
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