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Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods./
Author:	Posenau, Kelly.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2022,
Description:	124 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-12B.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28969892
ISBN:	9798834008699

Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods.
Posenau, Kelly.

Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2022 - 124 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2022.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

How do creditors influence the quality of local public goods through municipal debt contracts? I examine this question in the context of municipal water utility debt covenants. As utilities approach their covenant violation thresholds, they increase prices. But, utilities also reduce hiring growth and reduce manager pay. I also find that officials sequence their budget decisions according to a pecking order hierarchy: they raise revenues as much as possible, then cut spending. The incidence of cuts is first on water system expenses and then on administrative expenses. System problems and pipe breaks are most sensitive to distance to covenant thresholds for the most constrained utilities. These utilities respond on a per capita basis to a $1 move toward covenant thresholds by raising revenues $0.26, cutting water system expenses $0.19, and reducing administrative expenses $0.13. I confirm the pecking order using a drought shock to water demand: covenant-constrained utilities raise prices 9% relative to unconstrained utilities following the shock. Local hostility to taxes imposes an additional friction on the revenue-raising process. After accounting for tax hostility following the drought shock, the overall effect of the rate covenant for an average covenant-constrained utility is a 9.5% reduction in water system expenses.

ISBN: 9798834008699Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Covenants

Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods.
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245 1 0 $a Debt and Water: Effects of Bondholder Protections on Public Goods.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2022
300 $a 124 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-12, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Kashyap, Anil.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2022.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a How do creditors influence the quality of local public goods through municipal debt contracts? I examine this question in the context of municipal water utility debt covenants. As utilities approach their covenant violation thresholds, they increase prices. But, utilities also reduce hiring growth and reduce manager pay. I also find that officials sequence their budget decisions according to a pecking order hierarchy: they raise revenues as much as possible, then cut spending. The incidence of cuts is first on water system expenses and then on administrative expenses. System problems and pipe breaks are most sensitive to distance to covenant thresholds for the most constrained utilities. These utilities respond on a per capita basis to a $1 move toward covenant thresholds by raising revenues $0.26, cutting water system expenses $0.19, and reducing administrative expenses $0.13. I confirm the pecking order using a drought shock to water demand: covenant-constrained utilities raise prices 9% relative to unconstrained utilities following the shock. Local hostility to taxes imposes an additional friction on the revenue-raising process. After accounting for tax hostility following the drought shock, the overall effect of the rate covenant for an average covenant-constrained utility is a 9.5% reduction in water system expenses.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Water resources management. $3 794747
653 $a Covenants
653 $a Drought
653 $a Municipal bonds
653 $a Water utilities
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0595
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Business. $3 1671506
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-12B.
790 $a 0330
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2022
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28969892